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Summary
Pervasive computing systems are ‘aware’ of and self-adaptive to its environment changes.
Many successes have been achieved in laboratories especially for activity monitoring. How-
ever, such systems are not widely deployed due to, not only scalability and a lack of guar-
antees for correctness and reliability, but also the fact that those systems are designed for
demonstration purpose with well controlled scenarios in a specific lab environment. Existing
approaches such as software testing and simulation are laborious and not su cient since
only partial system behaviours are explored. Formal methods, especially model checking
techniques are needed to model and reason the real environment. In this thesis, we propose
to apply model checking techniques to systematically analyse pervasive computing systems.
First, a formal modelling framework is proposed with general modelling patterns for both
the system design such as concurrent communications, context reasoning behaviours etc.
and the environment including the human behaviours. Critical requirements concerned by
stakeholders are specified as assertions which are verifiable against the system model. Sec-
ondly, we present a systematic rule anomaly detection approach. A tool is developed to
automatically translate Drools Rules to CSP# modelling languages. Rule anomalies can
then be detected automatically by reusing existing verification algorithms. Furthermore,
MDP-based probabilistic model checking techniques are applied to perform reliability anal-
ysis. We target at three questions: 1) reliability prediction- “What is the overall reliability
of the system based on known component reliability?”; 2) reliability distribution- “To reach
a certain overall system reliability, how reliable should the sensors/networks be?”; 3) sen-
sitivity analysis- “Which node (could be a sensor or network device) has the most critical
impact to the overall reliability?”.
Last but not the least, case studies on a real-world pervasive computing system AMUPADH,
demonstrate the usefulness of our approaches. AMUPADH is designed for monitoring and
assisting elderly with dementia to live independently and is deployed in a Singapore based
nursing home. Existing model checkers such as PAT and RaPid are adopted for carrying
out verification experiments. Unexpected bugs and system flaws are exposed which are
confirmed by system engineers.
Key words: System Analysis, Model Checking, Pervasive Computing Systems,
Ambient Assisted Living System, Healthcare, Correctness Analysis, Reliability
Analysis, Case Study
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Envisioned by Mark Weiser in the 90’s, ubiquitous computing, aka pervasive computing
is becoming the new computing paradigm of the 21st century, that computers disappear
from the environment and “weaved themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are
indistinguishable from it” [84]. Significant hardware developments such as location sensors,
wireless communication and mobile computing technologies have advanced Weiser’s vision
toward reality. Nowadays, the pervasive computing system (referred to ‘PvC system’ in the
rest of the thesis) is emerging as a promising solution to problems risen with the proliferation
of ageing population in all industrialised societies, e.g. creating enormous costs for the
need of intensive care of elder people. Such systems make it possible for elderly people
to stay in their homes longer and manage everyday tasks without significant burden for
their caregivers [56, 83, 63]. These systems usually incorporate complex technologies in a
layered architecture design: a physical layer with sensors to monitor the environment and
user behaviours; a middleware layer to manage and reason the sensed contexts so as to
be aware of what’s happening in the environment; an application services layer to make
adaptations to environment changes by invoking actuators. Consequently, PvC systems are
highly complex due to concurrent interactions among all these layers.
1
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PvC systems can be safety critical, especially for smart healthcare systems built for elderly
people. They are intelligently adaptive to the environment and fully automatic with little
or no human supervision. Consequently, an error occurred in the system could harm the
user’s safety. For example, if a call-for-help reminder fails to be sent when the elderly user
falls, he/she could be left unattended for a long time causing severe consequences. As a
result, it is essential to adequately test and verify the system before they are deployed.
However, these complex systems are developed without e↵ective techniques to guarantee
its correctness and reliability. Traditional techniques such as simulation and testing are
evidenced to be expensive and not complete. In fact, to set up all hardware devices for
testing is of high cost and time consuming. Furthermore, it is an impossible task for system
engineers to consider all possible scenarios during development.
On the other hand, formal methods, especially model checking techniques are potential
solutions to combat the weakness of these conventional methods. Model checking [37] is an
automatic technique that can establish, via exhaustive analysis of the model of a system,
whether its behaviour is correct with respect to a given specification. There are a number
of successful stories in past years [86, 52]. Recently, it gained the most attentions for
Intel’s breakthrough on validating their new processor Core i7 fully by model checking and
without using a single test case [38]. Model checking has a number of advantages compared
with traditional techniques. It is automatic and complete with counterexamples generated
to help the designers pinpoint the sources of the system flaws. Besides, model checking
techniques do not require the actual system to be deployed and they can easily scale up to
larger system models by proper abstraction and applying advanced state space reduction
algorithms.
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1.1 Summary of This Thesis
A number of formal approaches have been proposed for analysing PvC systems. However,
most of them can only be applied to some component of the systems and some of them are
not automatic which is infeasible for large systems. In this section, we summarise some of
the challenging problems and propose our solutions to them.
1.1.1 Challenging Problems
• Correctness is essential to PvC systems which are usually fully automatic with little or
even no human supervision. In order to apply model checking techniques, the foremost
step is to properly model the system. A model of a PvC system should include models
of all its components (i.e., sensors, network communication, rule-based reasoning and
application adaptation) and the interactions among them. However, up till now, there
is no modelling approaches to integrate all the component models in one framework.
Besides, the system is usually user-centred. Modelling of the user behaviours is also
important but often omitted in existing works.
• Rule-based activity recognition based on multi-modal sensor readings have been pro-
posed to enable a PvC system to be shared by multiple users [82, 29, 74]. However,
those rules are manually defined and error-prone. Incorrect or vague rules, could im-
pair the system’s capability in recognising activities, which further result in a lack
of, or inappropriate service to be o↵ered. Due to the relatively large number of rules
and various scenarios that have to be tested in actual deployments, an automatic rule
verification approach is needed while existing methods are not directly applicable.
Most of the existing approaches were developed in 1990’s for stateless rules (where
knowledge are not shared during di↵erent runs of rule evaluation) while nowadays
stateful rules are used more often in practical reasoning systems.
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• A PvC system is considered reliable when all the assistance services are delivered at
the right scenario to the right user. However, there are many causes leading to a
unreliable system, e.g., sensors (less sensors or low-capability but cheaper sensors are
used due to budget constraints [59, 65]) have limited detecting range and battery life,
signal strength of wireless network drops with the increasing of distance. Thus, relia-
bility analysis is critical for improving the quality of services provided by the system.
Nevertheless, nondeterminism caused by unpredictable user behaviours prevents the
direct use of existing techniques.
• There have been a number of smart systems being studied using formal methods
in the past years. Those case studies are considered simple in the sense of limited
concurrency. They are either single-user based or using simple sensors with less or
no use of rules. However, smart systems nowadays are complex adopting a multi-
modal sensor platform (also known as sensory data fusion) to enable multiple users
sharing the environment concurrently. Thus, large case study on a complex real-life
application is desired to show the feasibility of model checking technique.
1.1.2 Thesis Structure
To meet the challenges listed above, we propose a systematic formal analysis approach
including specific methods targeting at di↵erent problems. In summary, the contribution of
the thesis are explained below.
Correctness Analysis via Concurrent System Model Checking We propose a for-
mal framework to systematically analyse PvC systems. Firstly, modelling patterns for
unpredictable user behaviours and concurrent interactions between system components are
proposed and illustrated with examples. Furthermore, we formally specified critical prop-
erties like safety (nothing bad happens) and liveness (something good eventually happens)
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extracted from interviews of the stakeholders (system designers and caregivers of system
users). Finally, we demonstrate a case study on a smart healthcare system for mild demen-
tia patients, AMUPADH [11]. AMUPADH system has a multi-person sharing environment
which exhibits additional complexity in terms of concurrent interactions. We adopt CSP#
as the modelling language for its rich set of syntax in modelling concurrent system with hi-
erarchies. Critical properties such as deadlock freeness and guaranteed reminder service are
verified using Process Analysis Toolkit (PAT model checker) [77] (a self-contained frame-
work for modelling, simulating and reasoning of concurrent and real-time systems). Multiple
unexpected bugs such as conflicted reminders are detected at the early design stage.
Automatic Rule Anomaly Detection via Model Checking ACARP, is proposed as
an automatic rules verification approach based on exhaustive manipulation of all possible
scenarios. It is discovered that rule anomalies such as conflict rules can be represented using
formal property specifications such as reachability and liveness properties. Thus,the rules
verification problem can be transformed into a model checking problem. By adopting the
formal modelling framework proposed in the first work, a scenario model is constructed.
Further, ACARP automates the rule modelling by translating rules into CSP# modelling
language for its support of external method calls. In such a way, the rule anomalies can
be automatically detected by reusing the existing model checking algorithms e ciently.
Experiment results show its usefulness to detect non-reachable, redundant and conflict
rules.
Reliability Analysis via MDP-based Probabilistic Model Checking Markov De-
cision Process (MDP) is chosen as the modelling formalism for its support of modelling both
probabilistic and non-deterministic choices. Based on the MDP models, three general ques-
tions of interest to end-users and developers are investigated, i.e., 1) Reliability prediction,
“what is the overall system reliability if reliability of all its components and subsystems
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are known, considering all possible user behaviours, and unreliable factors?”; 2) Reliability
distribution, “what is the reliability required on subsystems or some devices if there is an
expected reliability on overall system?”, which provides decision support for cost-e↵ective
selections of software or hardware components; 3) Sensitivity analysis, which is important to
found out the most critical parts to system reliability, based on quantitative measurement,
that relatively more e↵orts and fund can be spent on. A case study on the reminding system
of AMUPADH is demonstrated showing the system reliability is below 50%. Experiments
also suggest that increasing the reliability of Wi-Fi network is more e↵ective to improve the
system reliability than replacing certain sensors.
1.2 Outline
In this section, we briefly present the outline of the thesis and overview of each chap-
ter. Chapter 2 investigates the background information about common architectures and
features of PvC systems. It also introduces the model checking techniques developed for
concurrent, real-time and probabilistic systems respectively.
Chapter 3 illustrates a typical PvC system, AMUPADH which serves as a running example
in this thesis. AMUPADH system is a smart healthcare for assisting independent living
of elderly dementia people. The architecture includes three layers, i.e., data acquisition by
multiple sensors on physical layer, context processing and reasoning on middleware layer
and reminder service rendering on application layer.
Chapter 4 - 7 are the main chapters of this thesis and have the following structure. Following
an introduction of the specific problem and its challenges, we demonstrate our proposed
solution in details. A case study will be used to show the usefulness of our approach. Each
chapter will be closed with a discussion of related works.
Chapter 4 presents the formal modelling framework with modelling patterns for the im-
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portant components of PvC systems. We also identify the critical requirements commonly
asked by stakeholders of smart systems.
Chapter 5 applies our formal analysis approach to AMUPADH system. A number of prop-
erties are verified against the system model which includes deadlock freeness, guaranteed
reminders etc..
Chapter 6 further extends our formal analysis approach to rules verification. Considering
there are large number of rules which are being frequently changed, we design a tool for
automatic rule modelling using a translation approach. By specify rule anomalies as formal
logic expressions, we are able to detect the redundancy, and conflicts in the reasoning rules.
Chapter 7 investigates reliability analysis using MDP-based probabilistic model checking
techniques. We explore three problems which are reliability prediction based on known
reliability value of system components, reliability distribution on certain nodes upon a
reliability requirement on the system and sensitivity analysis aiming to find the most critical
component which a↵ects the system reliability.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a discussion on open problems.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Pervasive Computing Systems
A PvC system is an intelligent system with sensors, network and software system. It is
context-aware and automatically adaptable to environment changes such as turning on the
light when a person enters the room. Moreover, such system is no longer a static piece of
software, but a complex system build up upon technologies across multiple disciplines of
computer science and engineering, including wireless sensor network, rule-based reasoning
software, distributed computing, human computer interaction and service oriented archi-
tecture etc. This type of system first introduced by Mark Weiser [84] refers to the seamless
integration of devices into the users everyday life. Appliances should vanish into the back-
ground to make the user and his tasks the central focus rather than computing devices and
technical issues. PvC systems are gaining intense attention and are emerging. Projects
such as Oxygen [54] in MIT, Aura [17] in Carnegie Mellon University and AMUPADH [11]
in Singapore have been launched years ago to achieve an intelligent world.
A PvC system is also referred to a number of other names. For example, “Ubiquitous Com-
11
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puting”, first named by Mark Weiser and his colleges in Xerox PARC. IBM related this
notion to the slogan of “everywhere at anytime” as this technology should be pervasive.
However, Phillips likely to call it Ambient Intelligent System and “Ambient Assistive Liv-
ing” is usually adopted in healthcare domain. Researchers from UK are more familiar with
the name “Sentient Computing”. Other names such as “Context-Aware System”, “Smart
System” and “Calm Technology” are also used by researchers and industry people. How-
ever, all the names refer to the similar technology which is pervasive and intelligent. The
di↵erence between these names are purely academic said in the paper [67].
In this section, the necessary background of PvC systems is introduced. It includes the
most common architecture of the system and the important features and challenges of the
system for the research purposes of this thesis.
2.1.1 The Typical Architecture
Many approaches for implementing PvC systems are proposed in the literature [10]. These
approaches di↵er due to special requirements and conditions such as location of sensors, the
amount of possible users or the available resources of the used devices etc.. When analysing
the various design approaches in modern applications, a common architecture is identifiable.
The system usually adopts a layered design, as shown in Figure 2.1.
The first layer consists of a collection of di↵erent sensors. It is notable that the word ‘sensor’
not only refers to sensing hardware but also to every data source which may provide usable
context information. This layer seamlessly monitors the changes in the environment such
as changing of temperature, user’s presence/ absence. It also provides raw contexts to other
layers.
These raw contexts are then aggregated at the second layer, the middleware. The mid-
dleware layer is usually implemented on a centralised server for the purpose of context
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Figure 2.1: The Common Architecture of Pervasive Computing Systems
management and reasoning. Raw context information is interpreted from sensing signals to
software understandable contexts. For example, a ‘1’ in a message from the shake sensor
on shower pipe is interpreted to be a context ‘Showering’ and some id ‘1’ in a message from
RFID reader in the shower room is known as ‘user Jane is in the shower room’. Contexts
interpreted from sensors are known as low-level contexts. The reasoning process in the mid-
dleware further combines these low-level contexts to infer high level contexts. For example,
combining the contexts ‘Showering’ and ‘user Jane is in the shower room’, a high-level
context information is inferred as ‘user Jane is taking shower’.
In the third layer, the application layer, the responsive reactions such as prompting reminder
services are implemented. Based on various high-level contexts provided from the second
layer, di↵erent pre-defined services are activated for specific scenarios. For instance, in a
smart meeting room system, the meeting service will automatically turn on the projector
when a meeting scenario is detected.
The system interacts with the environment via sensor layer to detect changes and application
layer to feedback/ adapt to changes. The architecture of PvC systems has evolved to be
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layered during the last years. This separation of detecting, processing and using contexts
is necessary in order to improve extensibility and reusability of systems. Understanding of
the common architecture is critical to analyse PvC systems. Based on the architecture, it
is able to identify the important components and their functions, find out the connections
between di↵erent layers and more importantly to extract information/ knowledge that are
shared among components.
2.1.2 Important Features and Challenges
PvC systems are complex that they usually incorporate many di↵erent technologies. They
are systems consisting of heterogeneous sub-systems yet di↵erent from any existing computer
systems [68, 71]. From the literature survey and the research experience, some of their
distinct features to the interest of this thesis are summarised as follows.
Heterogeneity The innovation of the PvC system is that it integrates all the possible
technologies developed so far to make computing devices serve people quietly. Then the
challenge is how to integrate all the heterogeneous technologies in to one framework and
make them working together smoothly. This heterogeneity exists in all the necessary parts
of the system [68]. Sensors are the most obvious example. There are enormous sensors
developed in di↵erent companies and countries and based on di↵erent standards [23]. The
system usually relies on multi-modality of these sensors which includes sensors that detect
pressure on the bed, sensors that could sense the door open/ close and sensors which moni-
tors the water flow of the shower pipe. Furthermore, the sensors usually have very di↵erent
refreshing rates. For instance, a pressure sensor may send the data every 1 millisecond while
a reed switch sensor on the door may send its data every 1 second. These di↵erent refresh-
ing rates often cause the reasoning engine to conclude false results due to the incomplete
knowledge of the environment. Moreover, this heterogeneity could be even a nightmare for
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engineers when the system is deployed in the real environments. A large team of engineers
where each one of the them is specialised in a particular technology is needed to cooperate in
the deployment. A failure happened in the system may involve multiple engineers working
together to pinpoint the source of the problem.
Thus, the heterogeneity becomes a challenge to analyse PvC systems. The analysis approach
should be able to model these inherently di↵erent devices and components. Many existing
technologies such as testing and simulation get hindered by this challenge. What’s more,
sensors and wireless networks exhibits unreliable behaviours, e.g., sensors fail from time
to time and networks get congested causing message loss. Managing the system at an
acceptable reliability rate is another key challenge.
Context-Aware and Adaptive Contexts are referred to any information that could be
used in the system, especially the information of the environment such as the time, the tem-
perature or the location where the person presents. PvC systems are aware of its contexts
and continuously adapting to the context changes [71]. These two characteristics di↵eren-
tiate PvC systems from other computing systems. The context-awareness is accomplished
by the context manager and the reasoning engine in the middleware. As introduced in
Section 2.1.1, the context manager collects and interprets the context stream sent by the
sensors and the reasoning engine combines and infers high-level, software-understandable
contexts. Adaptations to the environment changes are made based on predefined rules.
These important features further require the analysis approach be able to modelling the
shared information and the concurrent communications among components.
System of Systems The emerging system-of-systems (SoS) concept refers to a collection
of many independent, self-contained systems where their integration o↵ers more function-
ality and performance than simply the sum of these sub-systems. In a PvC system, the
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networked sensors, the business rules engines and various applications such as Bluetooth
speaker, TV and so forth are likewise systems. Thus, a pervasive computer system is an
SoS because it is an assemblage of components that are individually regarded as systems.
The PvC system also satisfies Maier’s definition of SoS or “collaborative system” [50], that
‘its components fulfilled valid purposes in their own right and continued to operate to fulfil
those purposes if disassembled from the overall system, and the components systems are
managed (at least in part) for their own purposes rather than the purposes of the whole’.
This feature requires the formal approach to have the ability of modelling and reasoning
the compositional relations between sub-systems. Besides, it is a big challenge to analyse
huge system state space yielded from the composition of sub-system state spaces.
2.2 Model Checking
Principal techniques for formally analysing complex system behaviours include testing, sim-
ulation, deductive reasoning, and model checking. Simulation and testing approaches test
system outputs with certain inputs against the expected results. However, they are very
expensive and infeasible for complex systems with various unexpected behaviours and not
complete because only a subset of possible behaviours are covered. Deductive verification
uses axioms and proof rules to prove the correctness of the systems, which can handle infinite
state systems but it is a manual approach that is time consuming and requires expertise.
Model checking is an automatic approach for verifying finite state systems. It di↵ers from
other methods in two crucial aspects: 1) it does not aim of being fully general; 2) it is fully
algorithmic and of low computational complexity1.
1The complexity of most model checking algorithms is proportional to the state space or the product of
the state space and property.
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2.2.1 Basics of Model Checking
Model checking [37] is a verification technique that explores all possible system states in a
brute-force manner. In order to formally analyse system behaviours using model checking, a
system model needs to be constructed and abstracted from the original system design using
certain formalism accepted by a model checker. Hereafter, the requirements of the systems
are specified as properties in proper logics. One common example is temporal logic, which
can assert how the behaviour of the system evolves over time. Finally, the verification of the
specification against the system model is then conducted automatically by a model checker.
The result will be returned with witness traces or counterexamples. The analysing of the
error trace may require modifications to the model and repeat the model checking process.
Since model checking needs to fully explore the system space, thus it is required for the
system model to be finite with bounded data size and finite number of processes. How-
ever, to examine the large state space using limited processors and memories remains a
big challenge in model checking domain. State-of-the-art model checkers based on explicit
state-space enumeration can handle about 108 to 109 states. Thus, the main bottleneck of
model checking techniques is the infamous problem, state space explosion. This is also a big
problem in formally analyzing pervasive computing systems due to the various communica-
tions between system components and the shared data variables which explodes the system
state space exponentially.
2.2.2 Concurrent System Model Checking
Our home grown model checker, Process Analysis Toolkit (PAT) [2] is a self-contained
toolkit to analyze concurrent systems, which supports of system modeling using CSP#,
animated simulation and automatic verification of properties specified in LTL semantics
and others.
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Figure 2.2: Architecture Design of PAT
Fig. 2.2 shows the architecture design of PAT with four components, namely the editor, the
parser, the simulator and verifier. The editor is featured with powerful text editing, syntax
highlighting and multi-documents environment. The parser compiles the system models
and the properties into internal representation which is a labeled transition system. PAT
adopts a fully automated abstraction technique to build an abstract finite state machine
from the model. Further, it weakly bi-simulates the concrete model and, therefore, we may
perform sound and complete LTL-X (i.e. LTL without the next operator) model checking
or refinement checking upon the abstraction. The simulator allows users to perform various
simulation tasks on the models: complete states generation of execution graph, automatic
simulation, user interactive simulation, trace replay and etc. Most importantly, PAT im-
plements several verification algorithms catering for safety, reach-ability, liveness properties
verification, refinement checking and etc. To achieve good performance, advanced optimisa-
tion techniques are implemented, e.g., partial order reduction, process counter abstraction,
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parallel model checking, etc. These verification algorithms perform on-the-fly exploration
of the state space. If any counterexample is identified during the exploration, then it can
be animated in the simulator for the purpose of debugging.
Modeling Languages- CSP# Modelling languages such as CSP [34] use mathematical
objects as abstractions to represent systems and processes. System behaviours are described
as process expressions combined with compositional operators, which are associated with
elegant algebraic laws for system analysis. Nonetheless, modelling systems with non-trivial
data and functional aspects using CSP remains di cult. Solutions are proposed such as new
languages by integrating process algebras like CSP, CCS [53] with state based languages
like Z languages or Object-Z language. However, declarative languages such as Z are very
expressive but not executable. Automatically analysing system behaviours using these
languages is extremely di cult. CSP# (short for communicating sequential programs)
proposed in [75] instead extends CSP directly with low level programs eases the modelling
and verification of computing systems. This language maximally preserves the original CSP
and treats sequential programs as atomic events.
Sequential Programs as Events Shared variables o↵er an alternative means of commu-
nication among processes. They record the global state and make the information available
to all processes.
1. #define NoOfPatient 2;
2. enum {SILENT ,FIRING};
3. var sensors[9];
where define, enum and var are reserved keywords. The former defines a global constant,
e.g., NoOfPatient which denotes the number of patients sharing the room. The middle
one is a syntax sugar for define that enumerates the global constants. Silent and firing are
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two statuses of the PIR sensor used to capture the human presence. The latter defines a
variable, e.g., sensors[9] which stores the current status of each sensor. CSP# has a weak
type system and therefore type information is not necessary for variable declaration. By
default, all the above defined are treated as integers or arrays of integers. We use PAT to
verify that the constraints hold given any system behaviour.
Composing Programs CSP# reuses high level composition operators in CSP since they
are very useful in modelling system behaviours. Furthermore, process equivalence can be
proved or disproved by appealing to algebraic laws which are defined for the operators.
A CSP# specification may contain multiple process definitions. A process definition gives
a process expression a name, which can be referenced in process expressions. The following
is a BNF description of the process expression
P ::= Stop | Skip | e{prog}! P | ch!exp ! P | ch?x ! P |
P \X | P ; Q | P [] Q | P u Q | if b {P} else {Q} |
[b]P | PkQ | Pk | Q | P 4 Q | ref (Q)
where P ,Q are processes, e is a name representing an event with an optional sequential
program prog , X is a set of event names (e.g., {e1, e2}), b is a Boolean expression, ch is a
channel, exp is an expression, and x is a variable.
Stop is the process that does nothing. Skip = X ! Stop, where X is the special event of
termination. Event prefixing e ! P performs e and afterwards behaves as process P . If e is
attached with a program, the program is executed atomically together with the occurrence
of the event. Channel communications, ch!exp ! P and ch?x ! P are considered as events.
The former evaluates the exp (with the current valuation of the variables) and puts the value
into the tail of the respective bu↵er in there is any and behaves as P . Process ch?x ! P
gets the top element in the respective bu↵er, assigns it to variable x and then behaves
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as P . If the channel is declared without a bu↵er than the sending and receiving events
have to be synchronized. Process P \ X hides all occurrences of events in X . Sequential
composition, P ; Q , behaves as P until its termination and then behaves as Q . External
choice P⇤Q is solved only by the occurrence of a visible event. On the contrast, internal
choice P u Q is solved non-deterministically. Conditional choice if b {P} else {Q} behaves
as P if b evaluates to true, and behaves as Q otherwise. Process [b]P waits until condition
b becomes true and then behaves as P . Notice that it is di↵erent from if b {P} else {Q}.
One distinguishing feature of CSP is alphabetized multi-processes parallel composition.
Let P ’s alphabet, written as ↵P , be the events in P excluding the special invisible event
⌧ . Process PkQ synchronizes common events in the alphabets of P and Q . In contrast,
process Pk | Q runs all processes independently (except for communication through shared
variables). Process P 4 Q behaves as P until the first occurrence of an visible event from
Q . A process expression may be given a name for referencing. Recursion is supported by
process referencing. The operational semantics for CSP# is attach in Appendix A.
Property Specification
PAT supports a rich family of property specification which includes safety, liveness proper-
ties. These properties are supported in two ways regarding direct support with keywords
and manually specifying using formulae of linear temporal logic.
Safety Property A safety property refers to “something bad never happens”. In general,
safety property requires the absence of deadlocks and similar critical states that cause the
system to crash.
Deadlock-free is defined as the system will never enter a deadlock state which has no out-
going transitions. Deadlock is highly undesirable and mostly caused by a design error in
concurrent systems. A typical deadlock scenario occurs when components mutually wait
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for each other to progress. Deadlock freeness checking is directly supported in PAT using
the keyword deadlockfree.
A more general form of safety property can be stated as a logic formula of the atomic
propositions, e.g., ¬(personInBedroom ^ PersonInShowerRoom) is a safety property mean-
ing that a person cannot be in two places at the same time.
Liveness Properties and Linear Temporal Logics Liveness properties mean that
“something good will eventually happen”. This property is useful in expressing the desirable
system behaviors such as if the system can fulfill its mission. For example, PvC systems for
healthcare are required to provide e↵ective help when patients are in danger. This property
can be expresses as system will eventually prompt a reminder to ask the patient to sleep
when he is sitting on bed for too long.
Model checking based on temporal logic formulae has been proved e↵ective as well as in-
tuitive. For explicit state and event based modeling languages such as CSP#, state-based
temporal logic such as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is a natural candidate for property
specification and verification. In the following, an interpretation of LTL based on CSP# se-
mantics is listed that this interpretation allows us to apply automata-based model checking
of temporal logic formulae constituted with both event and state propositions. Let Pr be a
set of propositions (formulated using predicates on global variables in CSP#). An extended
LTL formula is defined as follows.
  ::= p | a | ¬  |   ^  | X  | 2  | 3  |  U 
where p ranges over Pr and a ranges over ⌃. Let ⇡ = hs0, e0, s1, e1, · · · , ei , si , · · ·i be an
infinite execution. Let ⇡i be the su x of ⇡ starting from si .
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⇡i ✏ p , si ✏ p
⇡i ✏ a , ei 1 = a
⇡i ✏ ¬  , ¬(⇡i ✏  )
⇡i ✏   ^  , ⇡i ✏   ^ ⇡i ✏  
⇡i ✏ X ^  , ⇡i+1 ✏  
⇡i ✏ 2  , 8 j   i • ⇡j ✏  
⇡i ✏ 3  , 9 j   i • ⇡j ✏  
⇡i ✏  U , 9 j   i • ⇡j ✏  ^ 8 k | i  k  j   1 • ⇡j ✏  
The simplicity of writing formulae concerning events is not purely a matter of aesthetics.
It may yield gains in time and space. A model satisfies   if and only if every infinite
execution of LVP satisfies  . This above example of liveness property can then be expressed
as PatientSitOnBedTooLong ! 3Reminder Sleep.
2.2.3 Probabilistic Model Checking for MDPs
Markove Decision Processes (MDPs) are standard models for stochastic optimisation and for
modelling systems with probabilistic and nondeterministic or controlled behaviours [64, 80].
Verification algorithms designed for MDPs models are able to determine certain probabilistic
behaviours of the system such as predicting probability of reaching a goal state from an
initial state.
Markov Decision Processes
Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs) and Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are pop-
ular choices to model probabilistic systems. Given a set of states S , a distribution is a
function µ : S ! [0, 1] such that ⌃s2S µ(s) = 1. Let Distr(S ) be the set of all distributions
over S .
Definition 1 A DTMC is a tuple D = (S , init ,Pr) where S is a set of states; init 2 S is
the initial state; Pr : S ! Distr(S ) is a transition function. 2
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DTMCs are discrete stochastic processes satisfying the Markov property. A DTMC model
can be expressed by a stochastic matrix P : S ⇥ S ! [0, 1] such that Ps02S P(s, s 0) = 1.
An element P(si , sj ) represents the transition probability from state si to state sj . A state
is an absorbing state if it has only self-looping outgoing transitions, i.e., P(si , si) = 1.
Definition 2 An MDP is a tuple M = (S , init ,Act ,Pr) where S is a set of states; init 2 S
is the initial state; Act is an alphabet; and Pr : S ⇥ Act ! Distr(S ) is a labeled transition
relation. 2
Di↵erent from a DTMC, there may be multiple distributions from a state, and each is
labeled with a di↵erent action in an MDP. Intuitively, given a state s, an action (and the
corresponding distribution) is first selected nondeterministically by a scheduler, and then
one of the successor states is reached according to the probability distribution. A scheduler
is a function deciding which action to choose based on the execution history. A DTMC can
be defined by an MDP M and a scheduler  , which we denote as M .
With di↵erent schedulers, a state s may be reached with di↵erent probabilities. The mea-
surement of interest is thus the maximum and minimum reachability probabilities. Let B
be a set of target states. The maximum probability of reaching any state in B is denoted
as Pmax (M |= ⇧B), which is defined as: Pmax (M |= ⇧B) = sup  P(M  |= ⇧B). Similarly,
the minimum is defined as: Pmin(M |= ⇧B) = inf  P(M  |= ⇧B) which yields the lower
bound of the probability of reaching B . The supremum/infimum ranges over all, poten-
tially infinitely many, schedulers. Existence of optimal memoryless schedulers, in which the
decision for choosing next action/distribution based on the current state is independent of
the previous choices, has been proved in [9]. Based on the result, di↵erent methods have
been developed to calculate the maximum and minimum reachability probabilities. In this
proposal and the RaPiD [31] model checker we adopted, the popular method, value iteration
[9] is adopted.
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Value Iteration
Value iteration is an iterative approximation technique used to calculate the maximum and
minimum probabilities of reachability, and often yields better performance than solving
linear programs in practice [39]. In the following, we will demonstrate the application of
value iteration on finding the maximum probability for reaching any state in B from the
initial state. Let V be a vector such that, given a state s, V (s) = Pmax (M |= ⇧B) is
the maximum probability of reaching B from s. For instance, V (init) is the maximum
probability of reaching B from the initial state. First, using backward reachability analysis,
we can identify the set of states X which have non-zero probability of reaching B , i.e., B
is reachable from any state in X . Next, we iteratively build an approximation of V based
on the previous approximation. Let V i be the i -th approximation. We define V i such that
V i(b) = 1 for all b 2 B and any i ; V i(n) = 0 for all n 62 X and any i ; and for each state
s 2 X   B , we have
V 0(s) = 0;
V i+1(s) = max{Pt2S Pr(s, a, t)⇥ V i(t) | a 2 Act(s)}.
The first equation defines the initial approximation. In the second equation, Pr(s, a, t) is
the probability of reaching state t from state s through action a. V i+1(s) is set to be the
maximum probability of reaching B through any action based on the previous approxima-
tion. It can be shown that for every state s, V i+1(s)   V i(s) and we can obtain V in the
limit, i.e., limi!1V i = V . In reality, it may take many iterations before V i converges
and thus value iteration is often stopped using a number of di↵erent conditions (e.g., when
a fixed number of iterations have been reached or when the di↵erence between two succes-
sive iterations falls below a certain threshold). Minimum probability of reaching B can be
calculated similarly.
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Let the target state set B be {S2}. Note that all states have non-zero probability of reaching
B . Each transition is labeled with an action and a probability. Transitions labeled with
the same action belong to the same distribution. At state S0, there is a nondeterministic
choice between actions a and b. A scheduler decides whether to select a or b. Applying
value iteration, we have V i(S2) = 1 for any i and
V i+1(S3) = max{V i(S3), 1} = 1
V i+1(S1) = 0.1V i(S0) + 0.5V i(S1) + 0.4
V i+1(S0) = max{0.25V i(S0) + 0.5 + 0.25V i(S3),V i(S1)}
It is then easy to get V 0 = (0, 0, 1, 0); V 1 = (0.5, 0.4, 1, 1); V 2 = (0.875, 0.65, 1, 1); V 3 =
(0.96875, 0.8125, 1, 1); etc. 2
Each iteration involves a matrix-vector multiplication, which has a complexity of O(n2⇥m)
in the worst case, where n is the number of states in S and m is the maximum number of
actions from a state. Note that for sparse MDP models, the complexity is often O(n ⇥m).
The number of iterations required to achieve certain numerical precision is related to the
subdominant eigenvalue of the transition matrix [73].
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2.2.4 Real-Time Model Checking
The modeling language Stateful Timed CSP# models real time systems with a comparison
to Timed Automata and concept of timed refinement checking for verification of critical
properties.
Language Syntax of Stateful Timed CSP#
The Timed CSP# modeling language is a timed extension of Communication Sequence
Process (CSP) [34], its grammar is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Process) A timed process is defined by the following grammar.
P = Stop | Skip – primitives
| e ! P – event prefixing
| [b]P – state guard
| if b then P else Q – if-then-else
| P⇤Q – general choice
| PkQ – parallel composition
| P ; Q – sequential composition
| P \X – hiding
| P b= Q – process referencing
| Wait [d ] – delay
| P timeout [d ] Q – timeout
| P interrupt [d ] Q – timed interrupt
| P within[d ] – react within some time
| P waituntil [d ] – wait until
| P deadline[d ] – deadline
where P and Q range over processes, e 2 ⌃ is an observable event, b is a boolean expression,
X is a set of event names and d is an integer constant.
Stop is the process does nothing but idling, also denotes deadlock. Skip states termination.
Process e ! P performs event e first and then behaves as P. Notice that e may be an
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abstract event or a data operation, e.g. written in the form of e{x = 1; y = 2; } or an
external C# program. The data operation is used to update data variables and it is assumed
to be executed atomically. A guard process is written as [b]P . If b is true, then it behaves as
P , else it idles until b becomes true. A conditional choice is written as if b then P else Q . If
b is true, then it behaves P , else it behaves Q . An unconditional choice is written as P⇤Q .
The choice to choose which process to perform accords to what events are requested by its
environment. Parallel composition is written as PkQ , where P and Q may communicate
via variables, or multi-party event synchronisation. Process P ; Q behaves as P until P
terminates and then behaves as Q immediately. P \ X hides occurrences of events in X
by replacing them with ⌧ (an unobservable event). Process P b= Q defines P to be exactly
as Q . Processes may communicate through message passing on channels. Channel bu↵er
size must be greater or equal to 0. Notice that a channel with bu↵er size 0 sends/receives
messages synchronously.
Timed process constructs can be used to capture common real-time system behaviour pat-
terns. Process Wait [d ] delays the system execution for a period of d time units then it
terminates. In process P timeout [d ] Q , the first observable event of P should occur before
d time units elapse (since the process starts). Otherwise, Q takes control over after exactly
d time units elapse. Process P interrupt [d ] Q behaves exactly as P (which may engage
in multiple observable events) until d time units elapse, and then Q takes controls over.
Process P within[d ] constrains that P must react (by engaging in an observable event)
within d time units. Process P waituntil [d ] denotes P executes for at least d time units
and process P deadline[d ] constrains P must terminate within d time units.
Compared to Timed CSP#, Timed Automata [5] which is popular for specifying real time
systems during last decades, has certain deficiencies that it is not feasible in supporting
compositional models. Timed Automata are powerful in designing real-time models with
explicit clock variables. Real-time constraints are captured by explicitly setting/reseting
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clock variables. A number of automatic verification supported for Timed Automata have
proven to be successful (e.g. UPPAAL [41], KRONOS [12] and RED [81]). However, in
industrial case studies of real-time system verification, system requirements are often struc-
tured into phases, which are then composed sequentially, in parallel and alternatively [32].
High-level requirements for real-time systems are often stated in terms of deadline, time
out, and timed interrupt. Unlike Timed CSP#, Timed Automata lack high-level composi-
tional patterns for hierarchical design. As a result, users often need to manually cast those
terms into a set of clock variables with carefully calculated clock constraints. The process
is tedious and error-prone.
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Chapter 3
A Running Example: AMUPADH
Healthcare System
AMUPADH is a project initiated in Singapore to design smart healthcare systems for mon-
itoring and assisting elderly dementia people’s daily living. Dementia is a progressive,
disabling, chronic disease common in elderly people. Elders with dementia often have de-
clining short-term memory and have di culties in remembering necessary activities of daily
living (ADLs). However, they are able to live independently or in assisted living facilities
with little supervision.
The system developed in AMUPADH is able to monitor the patients’ behaviours using
activity recognition techniques (sensors and reasoning rules) and o↵er help to the patients
(prompt reminders through actuators such as speakers etc.). It is deployed in a bedroom
with two beds and a shower facility. Di↵erent kinds of sensors are deployed in the room to
capture environment changes. For instance, the pressure sensor under a mattress is used to
detect whether the bed is empty or occupied. Sensors communicate with the controller via
Zigbee network. The controller in the middleware interprets sensor signals into low-level
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Figure 3.1: AMUPADH: An Overview of the System
contexts from which high-level contexts are inferred by the reasoning engine. This reasoning
task is performed based on a set of predefined rules written in Drools1 (based on First Order
Logic). Evaluation of these rules is triggered by a sensor message or periodically by a timer.
In the case that a rule is satisfied, the system will adapt to a new state by updating internal
variables or invoking reminder services. For example, if the activity of patient sleeping on a
wrong bed is recognised, the system will prompt a reminder requesting him to use his own
bed.
3.1 Environment Data Acquisition
In the system, multiple sensors are deployed to acquire information from the home environ-
ment. For example, if someone turns on the shower tap, the shake sensor on shower pipe
1Drools Expert: http://www.jboss.org/drools/drools-expert.html
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will be triggered and change its status to Unstationary . A signal is generated and then
sent to the central system via a Zigbee network. AMUPADH adopts a multi-modal-sensor
design for user monitoring. This is due to users’ privacy concerns, video cameras are refused
in home environment.
In AMUPADH, four types of sensors are deployed in the bedroom and shower room to
monitor the activity of dementia patients as shown in Figure 3.2.
• RFID Reader is for identification and tracking. There are two readers placed beside
the doors to detect who has entered the rooms respectively and two attached to each
bed to identify who is using the bed. Each patient is wearing an RFID tag placed in
a wrist band.
• Pressure Sensor is placed under the mattress of each bed to detect activities in bed,
e.g., sitting or lying.
• Shake Sensor can detect vibration. They are attached to water pipe and soap
dispenser for sensing the usage of water tap and soap respectively.
• Motion Sensor (A.K.A. passive infrared sensor (PIR)) can measure infrared light
radiating from objects in its range. It is used to detect the presence of the patient in
the shower room.
3.2 Context Processing and Reasoning
Upon receiving a signal, the central system interprets it into low-level context, i.e., sensor events
such as “Shower Tap On”. Di↵erent low-level contexts are provided from di↵erent sensors.
They are aggregated in the inference engine for reasoning and generating high-level con-
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Figure 3.2: AMUPADH: Sensor Layout in the Bedroom
texts, activities. This task is performed by evaluating predefined activity recognition rules
based on prior knowledge of user behaviours.
Rules are written in first order logic. A typical rule is like: if a shake sensor on shower pipe
changes its status to UNSTATIONARY and lasts for 30 minutes and a PIR sensor captures
movements of someone in the washroom, an abnormal behaviour, showering for too long is
recognised. Then a message will be sent to the server indicating some person with a name
is in an abnormal state of showering for too long. The messages are sent out via a shared
bus within the central system. DroolsA typical rule are in the form of the following:
rule "Person is showering for too long"
when
Sensor ( id == "shakeShower",
shakeState == Sensor.shake_state.UNSTATIONARY,
durationInSecond >= 30 )
Sensor ( id == "pirWashroom",
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pirState == Sensor.pir_state.FIRING )
$p : Person( name != "nurse",
location == Person.person_location.WASHROOM )
$x : XMPPInterface()
then
$x.SendData( "ACTIVITY.error." + "ShowerTooLong"
+ "." + $p.getName() );
end
The condition of this rule uses two contexts from shake sensor on shower pipe and PIR
sensor (for motion monitoring) in washroom and the context of user’s location. This rule
can be interpreted as: If the shake sensor on shower pipe changes to UNSTATIONARY
and lasts for 30 minutes, PIR sensor captures movements of someone in the washroom,
an abnormal behaviour, showering for too long is recognised. Then the engine will send
a message to the server saying that some person with a name is in an abnormal state of
showering for too long. The messages are sent out via a shared bus within the central
system. The full set of 23 rules used in the system is listed in B.
Note that, AMUPADH aims for a multi-user sharing environment which is a challenging
topic in the activity recognition area. In fact, it is not only important to know about which
activity is being carried on but also who is doing this activity. This adds complexity to the
process of defining rules and lowers the accuracy of activity recognition. Faults like forget
to put person’s identity into rule conditions could result in associating an wrong activity
and subsequently wrong reactions to a wrong person.
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3.3 Adaptation: Reminder Service Rendering
The reminding system listens to the messages sent from the inference engine and decodes it.
A number of simple rules are defined to deal with reminder service rendering. For example,
upon receiving the message Activity .error .ShowerTooLong .personA, the system will invoke
the service of playing a preloaded sound reminder on bluetooth speaker located in the shower
room correspondingly. In this case, the message is transferred via bluetooth technology. In
general, di↵erent message transmitting technology are used for di↵erent rendering devices.
For instance, for reminders on mobile phones, messages are transmitted from 3G network,
while for iPAD case, the small home wide Wi-Fi network is used.
In AMUPADH, there are essentially six reminders provided for helping the patients in highly
concerned situations.
• UWB: Using Wrong Bed Since a room in the RLA is shared by 2-3 people, the elder
patient, especially new residence, tends to lie on a bed without recognising whether
its his/her own bed.
• SBTL: Sitting on Bed for Too Long Some of the agitated patients often have
sleeping problems. They are easily bothered and irritated by what is happening in
the environment. A typical symptom is that the patient will get up at midnight and
sit on the bed for very long time until assisted by nurses/caregivers.
• SNS: Shower No Soap Due to memory loss, dementia patients constantly forget the
normal steps of performing daily activity. In the taking shower activity, the patient
could forget what to do next right after the shower tap is turned on. It is reported by
the nurses that some of the patient finish the shower very fast without applying soap.
Concerned about the personal hygiene, patients presenting this behaviour need to be
helped.
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• STL: Showering for Too Long Similar to the SNS issue, some patients will stand
under the shower head for a long time. It is a critical issue that exposing in the water
for a long time could cause the patient black out. If not helped immediately, it will
even cause death to the patient.
• TNO: Tap Not O↵ It is often the case that dementia patients forget to turn o↵ the
tap after showering. In order to save water and energy, this scenario is also detected
and reminded in the system.
• WiW: Wandering in Washroom Caused by initiation problem, it is possible for
the patient to forget at any step of the taking shower activity. Thus, a wandering
behaviour is also typical and patients need to be assisted in such cases.
The smart home care system developed in AMUPADH project has been deployed in a
Singapore based nursing home, PeaceHeaven2 for a six-month real life testbed. This nursing
home has 13 separate Resident Living Areas (RLAs), each designed as an individual home-
like environment. The rooms are equipped with two/three beds with a shower facility.
Three of these rooms each of which are shared by 2 or 3 people are selected for deployment.
2Located at 9 Upper Changi Road North, Singapore, 507706. Tel: +65-65465678.
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Chapter 4
A Formal Analysis Framework
Pervasive computing systems aim to provide people with a more natural way to interact with
information and services by embedding computation into the environment as unobtrusively
as possible [84, 24]. They are fully automatic with little or even no human supervision.
For example, systems are built for assisting the independent living of elderly with dementia
where nurses or caregivers intervene only when receive call-for-help alerts. Thus, such
systems are life-critical. It is highly important to know if the system behaves correctly as
expected before the deployment of such systems.
Correctness analysis of these smart systems is a challenging task. Firstly, these systems
are inherently complex. Revisited the general architecture in Chapter 2, the system usually
adopts a layered design with sensors in the physical layer to acquire environment contexts;
inference engines in the middleware layer to manage and reason these contexts as well as
make adaptation decisions; services in the application layer to invoke actuators to execute
the decisions. Consequently, the heterogeneity of technology and massive ad hoc interactions
among layers make PvC systems highly complicated [23]. Faults may appear in many
situations with very di↵erent causes. For example, a false reminder that a reminder is
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sent to the wrong user could be caused by the malfunctioning RFID reader or a wrongly
defined reasoning rule; the conflict reminders could be caused by conflict rules or not well
calculated timing issues. Furthermore, it is impossible to exhaustively enumerate all the
possible scenarios. Various environment inputs and unpredictable user behaviours cause the
system behaviours beyond control, especially when multiple users are interacting with the
system simultaneously. Techniques like simulation and testing are time consuming and not
su cient. System engineers have to run the system multiple times only to find out the cause
of an uncommon error. Even though, testing and simulation techniques can not provide
enough guarantee of correctness since these technology can only explore partial system
behaviours. From our experiences of working with system engineers, they usually focus on
setting up a demonstration based on selected scenarios without considering other useful
situations. In fact, the development and consideration of all possibilities when constructing
scenarios and rules is an impossible task and would either take many man-hours to find out
through actual deployment.
Formal methods especially model checking techniques are promising solutions that they do
exhaustive state space analysis and can be applied in the early design stage of complex
systems. By properly modelling the system behaviours and formally specifying the critical
requirements, it is able to automatically verify important requirements by exhaustive search
of all possible states of the system model. The violation of a requirement is usually witnessed
by a counterexample (e.g. an execution trace from the initial state of the model) which
provides a good guidance in pinpointing the source of the error. The first chanllenge to
apply this technique is to properly model the system. Unfortunately, most existing models
(e.g., TCOZ model in [21] and Ambient Calsulus model in [19]) have limited support for
modelling hierarchical structures. Besides, no general patterns regarding the modelling of
PvC systems are proposed in the literature. Henceforth, new methods are expected to be
able to model the typical behaviours of the system such as concurrent communications,























Figure 4.1: Formal Analysis Workflow
complex control logics and hierarchical structures. Furthermore, the constructed model
should be supported by certain model checker such that automatic verification is possible
for large systems.
To meet the challenges, we propose a formal modelling framework targeting at the general
architecture of PvC systems. Based on the modelling framework, specifications of important
correctness requirements are also provided. Thus, the typical workflow of our formal analy-
sis approach is shown in Figure 4.1. Since PvC systems are user-centred, understanding and
modelling of the user behaviours are important. Thus, the workflow starts with collecting
user and system information from stakeholders (e.g., in AMUPADH, Nurses/Doctors/Engi-
neers). In particular, we need to seek answers via observing the elderly people’s behaviours
and interviewing nurses and doctors for these questions: 1) What are the targeting activ-
ities of elderly people that are critical to be monitored? 2) How does the elderly people
performing such activities? How to identify if the user is performing the activity abnor-
mally that he/she needs help? 3) How does the nurses/doctors help the user in case of an
abnormal behaviour identified? In addition, by interviewing system engineers and reading
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design documents including pseudocode of the AMUPADH system, we need to know about
4) How does the system designed to identify the abnormal behaviour and provide assistance
to the user? Meanwhile, the critical requirements such as the system will not be dead or
reminders are always sent out at certain scenarios are also collected from both the nurses/-
doctors and the system engineers. Next, with the knowledge of both the user behaviours
and system design, we can formally model them as environment model and system model
respectively. The separation of user model and system model enables the flexible reusing of
them. The critical requirements are then formally specified as properties. Finally, a model
checker is used to automatically verify properties against the system model. Counterex-
amples are usually generated as feedback to stakeholders for improving the system design.
The contributions of our work are two-folds as explained below.
Firstly, we propose modelling patterns the system design and the environment inputs. Im-
portant characteristics of PvC systems such as context-awareness, layered architecture and
concurrent communications are discussed. Modelling patterns for these features are pro-
vided and illustrated with examples. We adopt CSP# [75] as the sample modelling language
for its rich set of syntax in modelling concurrent system with hierarchies.
Secondly, we identify critical properties of PvC systems and provide their specification
patterns in corresponding logics. According to the stakeholders (designers, engineers and
users of these systems), safety requirements are essential to PvC systems. Arapinis et. al.
in [8] proposed some critical requirements of a homecare system. For instance, “Sensors are
never o✏ine when a patient is in danger” or “If a patient is in danger, assistance should
arrive within a given time”. In our work, we classify the important requirements into
safety properties (nothing bad happens) and liveness properties (something good eventually
happens). Furthermore, formal specification patterns of these properties are proposed. As
a result, we can verify the critical properties against the system model by using automatic
verification techniques like model checking [37]. Hence, design flaws can be detected at the
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early design stage.
4.1 A Modelling Framework for Pervasive Computing Sys-
tems
PvC systems are carefully designed for users who expect the system to aid in their daily
life. They are usually complex and adopt a layered architecture as introduced in Chapter
2.1.1. In this section, we discuss the important features of PvC systems layer-by-layer and
propose corresponding modelling patterns for them. Besides, environment inputs perform
an important role in PvC systems. Thus, along with the modelling of system components,
we also propose modelling patterns for di↵erent environment aspects which are usually not
included in most complex systems models.
4.1.1 Modelling Environments
PvC systems seamlessly interact with the environments and acquire context inputs from
the users and objects like TVs and Beds. To some extent, PvC systems are driven by the
environment context change (we call it scenario here). For example, a person entering a
room which is previously empty will trigger the lights to be switched on; or when the system
detects the time is 9:00pm, a take-medicine-reminder will be sent to the patient. Thus, it is
important to model the scenarios with the system design. Meanwhile, the scenario model
is also important for generating meaningful counterexamples so as to alleviate the burden
of analysing verification results.
Modelling Activities and Environment Objects User behaviours are various and
usually unpredictable. For most PvC systems, we can observe that: 1) the system usually
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targets a certain group of activities and ignores other irrelevant ones; 2) relevant user activ-
ities are determined but the order of them is unpredictable. For instance, a person enters
the bedroom, then he may directly go to sleep or he could possibly enter the shower room
for other activities. In practice, targeted activities can be provided by system designers.
We use a shower room scenario to demonstrate the modelling patterns.
In the shower room, a user performs many activities such as wandering or turning on the
shower tap. These activities can be modelled as events which are abstractions of the obser-
vations. For example, an activity represented as event exitShowerRoom is an observation
of the user’s behaviour of leaving the shower room. However, it requires more advanced
language constructs such as non-deterministic choices to model all possible orders of ac-
tivities. We explain the idea using a CSP# model of the shower room scenario. All the
possible activities the patient can do in the room are modelled as di↵erent choices and they
are enclosed into a process named PatientShowerRoom.
PatientShowerRoom() = exitShowerRoom ! PatientOutside()
⇤ turnOnTap ! PatientShowerRoom()
⇤ turnOffTap ! PatientShowerRoom()
⇤ wandering ! PatientShowerRoom()
⇤ useSoap ! PatientShowerRoom();
Here, the operator ⇤ represents the non-deterministic choice. It operates this way that the
process PatientShowerRoom randomly choose an activity such as turnOnTap to execute.
Then it may transfer control to itself again and choose useSoap to execute. It is guaranteed
that all possible orders of activities are generated using state space exploration techniques
like model checking.
However, there might exist some unrealistic orders of events. For example, there is a
sequence which contains two consecutive events of turnOnTap. Obviously, the patient
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cannot perform turning tap on activity again if the tap is turned on already. In order to
eliminate such cases, we need to model these constraints such that the patient’s behaviour is
synchronised with the status of the object being used. In fact, it is essentially the problem
of modelling synchronous behaviours. We propose to use event synchronisation in CSP#
and give an example of shower tap model in the following. Other solutions are possible such
as using a global variable or synchronous channels.
ShowerTap() = turnOnTap ! turnOffTap ! ShowerTap();
Env() = PatientShowerRoom() k ShowerTap();
The constraint of using tap behaviours is modelled as if turnOnTap event happens, it will be
disabled until the turnO↵Tap activity is performed. The two processes PatientShowerRoom
and ShowerTap are composed to be a complete model of the environment, Env . Here, the
operator k denotes parallel composition. Its operational semantic says that the executions
of the composed processes must be synchronised on common events appearing in all of them.
Interested readers can refer to [75] for more details. Here, the turnOnTap event becomes a
common event between the two processes.
Modelling Location Transitions While modelling the patients behaviours, we divide
the activities according to the locations where they can be performed. In the PatientShowerRoom
model, if the event exitShowerRoom is engaged, the process will pass control to the PatientOutside
process. Thus, only activities outside can be selected to run while activities in the shower
room are disabled. This modelling approach is to reflect the location transitions in the
model and to generate realistic sequences of activities.
Modelling Multiple Users In multiple-user sharing environment, the activities that
di↵erent users can perform in a certain location are usually the same. However, in some
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cases, these activities need to be di↵erentiated. For example, in AMUPADH, the system
tracks di↵erent patients using RFID tags. Thus, the sitting on bed behaviour performed by
patient1 and patient2 are di↵erent from the system’s point of view. We model this require-
ment using the process parameters and events with indexes. In the following, we provide
the behaviour model of the patient using bed where identify information is important.
PatientBed(i) = sitOnBed.i ! PatientBed(i)
⇤ lieOnBed.i ! PatientBed(i)
⇤ leaveBed.i ! PatientBed(i);
Parameter i in process PatientBed(i) represents the identity of the patients. This identity
variable is also attached to events so as to di↵erentiate the activities performed by di↵erent
patients.
4.1.2 Modelling System Design
PvC systems share the features such as layered architecture and concurrent communications.
A common architecture of such systems is shown in Figure 2.1. In the following, we discuss
these common features and their modelling layer by layer.
Modelling Sensor Layer
There are a lot of interesting problems in this layer. First of all, there are di↵erent commu-
nication patterns like synchronous communication or asynchronous message passing. These
communications form the basic functionality of sensors. Additionally, di↵erent sensors have
di↵erent frequencies of sending messages. For example, RFID reader sends a signal to sys-
tem every 1 second while pressure sensor sends every 10 seconds. This issue may cause the
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system to make wrong adaptations since the information of the environment may not be
completely refreshed at some time point. Finally, sensors have limited power supply and
may fail from time to time. These two problems regarding the di↵erent sending rates and
unstable working conditions of sensors create many uncertainties in PvC systems.
Nonetheless, problems might also exist in the wireless network such as message loss. We
skip this part since research of model checking wireless networks has been done extensively
in the literature [58]. The details about signal encoding/decoding and message transmission
via wireless networks are abstracted away for simplicity in our work.
Modelling Concurrent Interactions Sensors interact with the environment by detect-
ing events and report sensed contexts by transmitting signals to middleware. The be-
haviours of detecting and transmitting can be abstracted to two modelling patterns which
are synchronous events and message passings respectively. Event synchronisation has been
introduced in Section 4.1.1. As for message passing, there are di↵erent modelling patterns
in di↵erent languages. Some languages support synchronous channels through which the
sending and receiving events are synchronised. In other languages, broadcast channels or
asynchronous channels with bu↵ers are supported. In the following, we model the shake
sensor using a synchronous channel.
channel port 0;
Shake_Sensor() = (
turnOnTap ! port!Shake.UnStationary ! Skip
⇤ turnOffTap ! port!Shake.Stationary ! Skip
); Shake_Sensor();
Here, port is the synchronous channel defined for the shake sensor to communicate with mid-
dleware. Shake, UnStationary and Stationary are integer constants representing the sensor’s
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ID and possible statuses. In the model, the shake sensor sends out the signal UnStationary
when the tap is turned on. Note that CSP# supports multi-process synchronisation that
the event turnOnTap can be synchronised in all three processes.
Modelling Frequency Sensors are tuned to have di↵erent sending rates due to their
functionalities and the purpose of saving energy. However, if the rates are not carefully
calculated, the system may work incorrectly. To analyse these behaviours, we propose
to use timed modelling languages such as Stateful Timed CSP (STCSP) [76] or Timed
Automata (TA) [5]. The modelling pattern of sending rates using STCSP would be as
follows.
FSR_Sensor() = (
sitOnBed ⇣ port!FSR.Sitting ⇣ Skip
⇤ lieOnBed ⇣ port!FSR.Lying ⇣ Skip
⇤ leaveBed ⇣ port!FSR.Empty ⇣ Skip
⇤ nothing ⇣ port!FSR.Empty ⇣ Skip
); Wait[10]; FSR_Sensor();
Here, operator⇣ denotes the urgent event in its left hand side which cannot be interleaved
by other timed events. Wait [t ] is the syntax to model the process idling for t time units.
The above process models the periodic behaviours of the pressure sensor which senses the
environment for certain activities and immediately transmits its status. Then it idles for
10 time units and starts sensing again.
Modelling Sensor Failures Sensors have limited accuracy, so that they may fail to
detect certain events. They could also run out of battery and then fail to send the signals.
Intuitively, we model this with probabilistic modelling languages such as Probabilistic CSP
(PCSP) [78] or Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA) [39].
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RFID_Reader() =
enterBedroom.1 ! port!RFID.PersonA ! Skip
⇤ enterBedroom.2 ! port!RFID.PersonB ! Skip;
MalSensor() = pcase{ 9: RFID_Reader()
1: fail ! Skip }; MalSensor();
Here, pcase is a syntax for modelling probabilities. 9 and 1 are probability weights here.
This process models that the RFID reader works correctly with probability of 90%.
In summary, di↵erent issues in the sensor layer can be modelled using di↵erent language
constructs. Notice that the two modelling languages (i.e., STCSP, PCSP) we adopted are
both extensions of CSP# language. As demonstrated in above examples, our intention is
that it is easy to start with a simple model and extend it with richer features with minimum
e↵orts.
Modelling Middleware Layer
As shown in Figure 2.1, middleware performs the tasks of managing and reasoning contexts
as well as making adaptation decisions. Messages received from sensors will trigger an
update of the system knowledge/contexts. The status of a sensor is one kind of contexts.
Context variables are modelled using shared variables in supporting modelling languages.
Furthermore, the reasoning engine performs reasoning by evaluating predefined rules whose
conditions are propositions of context variables. A common practice for specifying rules is
to use guarded processes or if-else statements. The following example models the rule in
Chapter 3.2 in CSP#:
Rule() = if(sensors[Pressure_Sensor] == SITTING &&
4.1. A MODELLING FRAMEWORK FOR PERVASIVE COMPUTING SYSTEMS 50
Duration[Pressure_Sensor] > 30)
res!Act.SitTooLong.1 ! Skip;
Finally, an adaptation decision will be made based on the reasoning results and sent to the
application layer to execute. This again can be modelled by message passing patterns. For
the above example, if the rule which interprets that someone is sitting on bed for more than
30 time units, a message will be sent to the application layer through the channel res.
Modelling Application Layer
Application layers vary according to di↵erent implementations. However, we may only care
about the responsive actions which will a↵ect the end users. Thus we focus on modelling
of how the adaptation decisions are executed. For instance, in the AMUPADH system, the
reminding system is modelled as follows:





updatereminder[rid][pid] = true ! Skip;
By decoding the message received from middleware, the workflow of reminder system diverts
according to the status command. If it is an Act command, the system activates reminder
rid to patient pid by calling ActivateReminder(rid , pid) process. Similar logic applies for
deactivating a reminder.
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4.1.3 Compose a Complete Model
In PvC systems, di↵erent components in di↵erent layers cooperate to fulfill the system
goals. However, how to model this cooperate relations are left to be discussed till now.
From a careful study, we discover that there are three kinds of relationships between these
components which are sequential, independent and concurrent relations. Sequential relation
means the execution of the components is strictly sequential according to the workflows of
the system. Components that are completely unrelated to each other execute independently.
As for concurrently related components, they have synchronised behaviours. These rela-
tions can be well supported in hierarchical languages such as CSP#. Respectively, these
three relations can be modelled as sequential, interleave and parallel compositions using
operators ; , k | and k respectively. Examples here may reuse some process names in above
models. Note that parallel composition has been introduced in modelling activities in the
environment.
Sensors() = Shake_Sensor() k | FSR_Sensor();
Middleware() = ContextManager(); ReasoningEngine();
AdaptationManager();
Here, since each sensor in the environment works independently, the sensor layer model
Sensors() is composed by the interleave operator. On the other hand, in the middleware
layer, the three components are executed sequentially as determined in the workflow. There-
fore, the middleware model Middleware() is composed using sequential operator.
4.2 Properties of Pervasive Computing Systems
After system engineers finished the design of a PvC system, they are often asked to provide
guarantees for correctness and even safety requirements. They may be asked to answer gen-
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eral questions like “Is the system free of conflict adaptations?” or “Will the services deliver
when they are supposed to?”. These high level requirements cannot be validated against the
system thoroughly using traditional techniques like testing. However, they can be specified
and verified using formal methods. For example, using model checking technique, the first
question can be verified in the following steps. First, define the conflict adaption scenario
as a state; Secondly, use reachability verification algorithms to exhaustively search the sys-
tem state space to see if such a state is reachable. In this section, we discuss the critical
properties and propose their specification patterns.
4.2.1 Desirable Properties
Properties regarding the good behaviours of the systems are desirable.
Deadlock freeness
Deadlock freeness is one of the important safety requirements. Deadlock is a situation that
the system reaches a state where no more actions can be performed. It can lead to serious
consequences such as falling of the patient is not being alerted to a nurse. Deadlock checking
is supported in most model checking tools.
Guaranteed Services
Well designed application services determine fundamental responsive behaviours of PvC
systems. For example, in a smart meeting room, upon detection of some one entered the
room, a service will be scheduled to run that it will invoke an actuator to automatically turn
on the lights. E↵ectiveness of these services is an important measurement of the system for
the sake of users. To specify this requirement, we propose patterns of liveness properties
using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). For example,
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#define PatientWandering (Pos_Person[1] == SHOWERROOM && WanderFlag);
#define LeaveRoomReminder (ReminderStage[WANDERING_IN_SHOWERROOM*2] 6= 0);
2(PatientWandering ! 3 LeaveRoomReminder)
Here, 2 and 3 are operators in LTL which read “always” and “eventually”. This formula
specifies the property meaning “Always when PatinetWandering situation happens, the
service LeaveRoomReminder will be eventually delivered”.
The services are usually required to be delivered in bounded time. Obviously, it is certainly
undesirable if the reminder is sent too late that even the patient has left the room. To
specify the bounded liveness properties, one can use Timed Computational Tree Logic
(TCTL) which extends CTL with clock constraints. The other possible solution is to bound
the target system model with deadline semantics in some real time modelling languages
such as STCSP.
Security
Since PvC systems carry lots of environment information including the user’s confidential
profiles, it is critical to protect privacy. Leakage of information can compromise the safety of
the user and his or her belongings. For instance, food delivery person should not have access
to the patients medical profile. Properties to describe security problem can be specified in
many kinds of logics such as LTL. For example,
2(FoodDeliveryPerson ! not (3 AccessPatientProfile))
Model checking techniques for security problems are proposed in papers such as [51].
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4.2.2 Testing Purposes
To test the system after being deployed is cumbersome considering the reengineering work-
load. Fortunately, those unwanted scenarios can be specified in properties and checked using
reachability verification algorithms.
System Inconsistency
Failures of sensors and wireless networks may cause contexts of the environment in the
system to be out of date. Thus system knowledge can be inconsistent with actual environ-
ments. By defining such conflicting states, you can test again the system model to see if
such a state is reachable.
Conflicting/ False Services
To guarantee the services being eventually delivered is not enough. It is also important
to check if these services are sent properly. Some problems have been reported by domain
experts such as conflicts of reminders [22]. These problems are especially common in multi-
user systems. For example, in AMUPADH, two conflicting reminders are prompted at the
same time that one asks the patient to leave shower room while the other asks the patient to
use soap to continue showering. This causes the confusion of the patient and could agitate
them. Another scenario is that the reminder is sent to the wrong person. These problems
can be specified in reachability properties.
Properties in rules
Rule-based reasoning engines are popular in pervasive computing systems. The correctness
of rules is essential to the correct behaviours of systems. Problems of these rules include
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duplicated rules, conflict rules and unreachable rules. This is also easy to specify. For
example, to check whether a rule is unreachable, the condition of the rule can be defined as
a state and property can be expressed as testing if the state is reachable.
4.2.3 Bounded Liveness Properties
Liveness properties properties such as guaranteed services checks if certain service is even-
tually delivered whenever an abnormal behaviour is detected. However, stakeholders often
require more than “eventually prompted”. The good behaviour should be whenever an
abnormal behaviour is detected the reminder should be prompted within a certain amount
of time. This is often referred as bounded liveness property which says something good
will happen soon, in bounded time. It usually requires the properties to hold within a
certain time bound. Bounded liveness property captures a wide range of timed require-
ments for safety critical complex systems. Taken AMUPADH system as an example, we
propose some sample properties specifying timed requirements in the following. We choose
the specification language which is supported in existing model checkers.
Guaranteed In-time Servicess
Taken example shown in 4.2.1. If the reminder is required to arrive within t time units once
this wandering behaviour is detected, we need to extend the LTL property with real time
constructs. Alternatively, we may use the timed extension of a branching time temporal
logic (CTL [15]), TCTL [33] which is usually supported or partially supported in model
checkers like UPPAAL. The guaranteed Wandering In Showerroom reminder prompted in
time is then specified as:
8 2 (PatientWandering ! 8 3t LeaveRoomReminder)
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Guaranteed In-time Reminders with Probability
In the case that, the system is modelled with probabilistic behaviours, the bounded liveness
will be changed to a liveness property bounded with both time and probability. For example,
a requirement says the Wandering In Showerroom should arrive within t time units with
a probability of 0.98 when the wandering behaviour is recognised. The property is then
specified using PCTL, a probabilistic extension of CTL as follows:
P  0.98 2 (PatientWandering ! 8 3t LeaveRoomReminder)
Bounded Message Delay
In network layer, message delay is a common problem due to network congestions. To
resolving the congestions, networks follows the policy of collision avoidance and retry mech-
anism that nodes like sensor in the network will wait for a certain time period to retransmit
its message. Thus, during the verification of network policies/ protocols, bounded message
delay is a desirable property. This requirement can be specified similarly as Guaranteed
In-time Reminders. An example is as follows:
8 2 (Node.MessageSend ! 8 3t System.MessageReceived)
Well Scheduled Reminders
One good behaviour of well scheduled reminders is that two di↵erent reminders are not
prompted to the same user within a time period t . It is specified as follows:
WanderInShowerroom.PersonA --> ShowerNoSoap.PersonA && (C_WIS - C_SNS < t)
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where C WIS and C SNS are clock readings of Wandering In Showerroom reminder and
Shower No Soap reminder respectively. Expressing properties with clock values are possible
in model checkers implemented with explicit clocks like UPPAAL.
Although formalisation of real-time requirements are strongly dependent on the specification
logic supported by model checkers, the sample property specifications we listed here are
common patterns and generally supported in popular model checkers like UPPAAL and
PRISM. However, it remained a challenging and interesting task to verify properties with
various timed requirements.
4.3 Related Work
Modeling Pervasive Computing Systems
TCOZ model of Smart Meeting Room TCOZ is essentially a blending of Object-Z
with Timed CSP, for the most part preserving them as proper sub-language of the blended
notation [49]. In [21], they manually modeled and verified the constraints and relations in the
context aware systems with a case study of a smart meeting room system. The concurrent
communicating patterns, sensor constraints and real time requirements are captured in
their model. In order to reason about important system properties and keep the size of
system model small, irrelevant implementation details such as how data transmits from
sensor to system is abstracted away. This strategy is reasonable and e↵ective. TCOZ is
concise and yet powerful for modeling system behaviors, many features of context-aware
systems can be naturally modeled using constructs of the language. However, the lack of
automated reasoning tool support, properties against the system needs to be verified by
manual proof/disproof. Thus it requires much expertise from the user which prevents this
language to be adopted widely in real system modeling.
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Advances are to be learned from TCOZ regarding the flexibility of modeling sensor con-
straints, sensor patterns and real time relations. However, our proposing approach di↵ers
with TCOZ in several aspects. First, we are aiming at proposing executable models that
can be simulated and automatically verified. TCOZ however extends from the declarative
languages are not automatically executable, thus hard to be supported in automated tools.
Additionally, in order to better locate the errors in the system, counterexamples needs to be
reported if a certain property is violated. This needs support from the language constructs
how such as trace semantics defined in CSP# languages family. However, this is not well
supported in TCOZ language.
Ambient Calculus model of Location-sensitive Smart Hospital [19] modeled an-
other mobile application in a hospital which provides location sensitive service to guide the
patient enter the proper room and prevent patient to get in dangerous places. They adopted
the Ambient Calculus [13] for the modeling and verified certain properties against the crit-
ical requirements of the system. Locality in this modeling language is very well captured
using ambients. However, only the patient’s interaction with the environment is modeled
in this case study. It is not clear of how other important features of PvC systems such as
adaptation logics and sensor communications can be modeled. And again lack of automated
reasoning tool adds more di culty to this language to be applied in real scenario.
Verification of Pervasive Computing Systems
Fault Patterns and Automatic Identification of Context-Aware Adaptive Ap-
plications (CAAAs) Sama and Rosenblum et, al. in [70, 69] focused on analysing
the adaptive behaviour which is essential PvC systems. They identified fault patterns of
such systems based on the experience of designing electronic devices, proposed a innovative
semantic model named Adaption Finite-State Machine (A-FSM) and proposed dedicated
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verification algorithms to detecting those fault patterns based on the A-FSM. The fault
patterns as well as the causes they identified is a good summary of existing PvC systems
and the state matrix data structure further facilitates the e cient verification algorithm
design.
Advanced techniques in their work such as A-FSM and state matrix data structure are
intuitive for representing the context-aware systems. This can be learned to our proposing
work by proper design. However, they didn’t mention how to model a system in A-FSM
or how models in other modeling language can be represented using A-FSM. In real cases,
PvC systems have various architectures and system components. Profile which can be
simply represented as states in A-FSM might be common in mobile applications but not
in PvC systems for healthcare. Thus there should be a formally definition for a state in
A-FSM in view of general PvC system. Moreover, they are able to identify fault patterns
and perform static analysis of rules to check errors in rules. However, since their rules
are priority based and the algorithms are also designed to tackle this feature, these fault
patterns and algorithms may be not applicable for general rules based reasoning engines
that doesn’t have priority. For example, the deterministic property might be unrealistic in
a smart system monitoring multiple persons because multiple rules can be triggered at the
same time by di↵erent person performing di↵erent activities in di↵erent places. The system
then diverges but this is not considered as an error.
Identifying and Formally Defining Properties in Verification of Pervasive Sys-
tems In [8], the authors proposed the key properties needs to be verified in PvC systems,
which are the security, safety and usability issues. Di↵erent property specification languages
are adopted for specifying di↵erent properties such as access control language RW for secu-
rity of patient profiles, applied Pi-Calculus for un-traceability of RFID tags. and temporal
logic for safety problems such as if a patient is in danger, assistance should arrive in given
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time. However, they didn’t discuss further on how these properties are to be checked against
which kinds of models, since there is no such modelling language that can build a model
checkable by all the mentioned properties in various specification logics.
Inconsistency Detection and Resolution Contexts gathered by sensors from the en-
vironment could be fault or inconsistent due to the limited accuracy of sensing technologies
and sensor failures. And such inconsistencies could cause serious problems to the system
such as fail to response to the environment change or adapt to false application. Wang
and Gu et. al. [82, 29] proposed ontology based context reasoning which defines rules
based on first order logic to specify the restrictions and consistencies among contexts. Xu
and Cheung proposed dynamic inconsistency detection by a semantic matching and incon-
sistency triggering approach in [89]. They further proposed a formula based incremental
checking approach based on a Consistency Computation Tree (CCT) [90]. However, these
approaches highly reply on expert knowledge in identifying and specifying those consistency
constraints as well as additional e↵ort on developing consistency checking algorithms. In
our approach, the only e↵ort is to specify a general inconsistent scenario and model checking
tools will automatically check all the state space to find such a scenario. In this work, we
propose a formal modelling framework for PvC systems. Di↵erent modelling patterns are
discussed according to the typical features of systems such as concurrent communications,
context-awareness and layered architectures. We also provide environment modelling pat-
terns which are usually not considered in modelling complex systems. Furthermore, critical
properties of safety and liveness requirements are identified and specified in proper logics
such as specifying guaranteed reminder services using LTL.
Chapter 5
Case Study: Formal Modelling and
Verification of AMUPADH System
In this case study, we applied the proposed approach in Chapter 4 to analyse the concurrent
behaviours1 in AMUPADH system. We adopt CSP# modelling language since it supports
most of the modelling patterns in the framework. Important properties are specified in
reachability semantic and LTL formulae. PAT model checker is chosen to parse the model,
build up the system state space and verify these properties. Experiment results are listed
and unexpected bugs are reported.
5.1 System Modelling
In this section, we model the environments and the system design using our framework and
use Labeled Transition Systems (LTS) for demonstration.
1Real time and probability features are not included in this work. Modelling and verification with these
two features are explored in Chapter 7 and Appendix C.
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Figure 5.2: Model: Surrounding Environment Modelling
5.1.1 Environment Model
As shown in Figure 5.1 and 5.2. These LTSs can be generated using simulation function
of PAT. In Figure 5.1, there are four possible locations that a patient can reside. The
transition edges between states are labeled with patient’s activities.
This patient model should be synchronised with objects within the surrounding environ-
ment. The objects that are modelled include doors of bedroom and washroom, beds and
washroom taps. The behaviour models of the doors and beds are shown in Figure 5.2a and
5.2b respectively.























(b) Bed Pressure Sensor
Figure 5.3: Model: Sensor Behaviours
5.1.2 Sensor Model
Di↵erent sensors are used in AMUPADH to monitor specific behaviours of the patients.
For example, pressure sensors attached to the bed mattresses are for monitoring how the
patients use the beds. The information captured by sensors is passed from sensors to the
controller via a synchronised channel port . Every sensor possesses multiple unique states
when made available to the system. Figure 5.3 shows the modelling of sensors using the bed
RFID readers and bed pressure sensors as mentioned in Chapter 3.1. Then, we combine all
processes of sensors to one process Sensors using composition patterns.
Sensors()=Rfid_Bedroom()
k | (Rfid_Beds() k FSR_Sensors())
k | (Rfid_ShowerRoom() k PIR_ShowerRoom())
k | ShakeSensors();
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5.1.3 Controller and Reasoning Engine Model
Inside the reasoning engine, rule evaluation is triggered by two processes, namely the
MainInterface and ContextChecker processes. In order to model the periodical evalua-
tion by ContextChecker , we use a constant integer RATE to represent the interval and
Duration variable to record elapsed time. The atomic syntax used here is to ensure the
process inside the block is executed without interference from other processes.








On receiving a message from any sensor, the MainInterface updates the sensor status and
Duration. After that, the FireAllRules process is invoked to perform reasoning. In the
model above, we use the syntax call(setTimer , id , status ,Duration) to call an external static
function setTimer (written in C#) to update Duration according to the input of sensor id
and status . This is a special feature in PAT, which allows users to separate complicated
calculation from the high level model in order to have a simple model with e cient verifica-
tion. The ContextChecker is similar to the MainInterface in updating sensor statuses and
Duration, but does so in a periodic cycle instead of using a listener.
The process FireAllRules sequentially evaluates every rule independent of the results from
previous cycles of rule evaluation and triggers proper actions such as setting a flag or sending
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a message to the reminding system. Messages are passed via a synchronous channel named
res. We model every rule in a separate process. In the following, we list one rule to illustrate
the modelling. The process Rule 14 1() models a complicated rule defined for recognising
the wandering behaviour of the dementia patient. It says if the shake sensor on shower tap
is stationary, the PIR sensor detects the patient’s presence has lasted for 15 time units, the
shower flag is still false and patient 1 is in the shower room, then patient1 is wandering
in the shower room. Consequently, the reasoning engine sets the wander flag to true and




Rule_14_1() = if(sensors[ShakeTap] == STATIONARY &&
sensors[PirShowerroom] == FIRING &&
Duration[PirShowerroom]   15 &&
!ShowerFlag && Location_Person[1] == SHOWERROOM){




Syntax if (cond) P1 else P2 means if the condition cond is true then process P1 is executed,
otherwise process P2 is executed. ShakeTap and, SITTING , Error andWanderingInShowerroom
are constants which denote sensor ID, sensor status, command to reminding system (the
other is Normal) and behaviour code. The rest of the rules are modelled similarly. The full
set of rules used in AMUPADH is listed in Appendix B.






Figure 5.4: Model: Reminding System Behaviours
5.1.4 Reminding System Model
In the system, reminders are activated/ deactivated upon receiving corresponding messages
from the controller. As shown in Figure 5.4, the reminding system receives a triplet from
the controller via channel res. This triplet consists of a command, behaviour code and
patient ID. If the command is ACT , the reminder rid will be activated and prompted to
patient pid , otherwise the specified reminder will be stopped if it is active. The ACT and
DEACT are command constants corresponding to Normal and Error in rule processes.
Finally we integrate all the sub-system models together into a process named SmartRoom()
using composition patterns introduced in Section 4.1.3.
5.2 System Verification
In this section, requirements concerned by system designers and users (patients/ nurses/
doctors) are formally specified and verified. Experiments are carried on a test bed- a PC
with Intel Xeon CPU at 2.13GHz and 32GB RAM.
5.2.1 Deadlock freeness (P1)
Deadlock freeness property is directly supported in PAT using the keyword deadlockfree.
However, there is a state space explosion problem of the SmartRoom() model which is cased
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Property Result #States /m #Transitions /m Time /s
P1.1 - - - OOM
P1.2 True 1.43 2.04 815
P1.3 True 10.8 15.8 7045
Table 5.1: Experiment: Deadlock Freeness Checking
by the using of multi-value global variables. Another observation occurs to us that the
system is deployed in the bedroom and shower room where there are no sharing of sensors
between the two rooms and the patients’ behaviour is exclusive to the rooms. In this case,
the complete system state space can split into two sub-system models- SmartBedroom()
and SmartShowerRoom(). We apply deadlock freeness checking separately on this two sub-
system models. In the experiment, the modification to the system model is trivial- removing
modelling parts related to the other room from the environment model and sensor models.
The property are thus specified as the following:
P1.1 #assert SmartRoom() deadlockfree;
P1.2 #assert SmartBedroom() deadlockfree;
P1.3 #assert SmartShowerRoom() deadlockfree;
As shown in Table C.22, both sub-system models are deadlock free. However, the state
space of SmartBedroom() model is much less than the state space of SmartShowerRoom()
model as shown in column 3. It is because there are more activities monitored in shower
room than bedroom. The more activities to be monitored, the more interleaving will be
produced which will significantly boosts the state space.
Since each layer of the system as well as the environment model are independent from each
other except for channel communications, we conducted the experiments incrementally.
2OOM- Out of Memory
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Model
Bedroom ShowerRoom BothRooms
#Sts /k Time /s #Sts /k Time /s #Sts /k Time /s
env 0.028 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.082 0.010
env+snr 0.157 0.080 0.072 0.030 0.906 0.339
env+snr+mdw 17.40 7.799 56.01 23.00 8319 4017
Complete 731.5 384.2 7059 4031 OOM OOM
Table 5.2: Experiment: Component Deadlock Freeness Checking
During verification of a particular component model, we abstract away the details of other
component models leaving only the channels for receiving messages. Doing in this way,
we are able to check deadlock freeness locally for all system components and keep the
composition of component models in a manageable level. In the table 5.23, the row starts
with env represents the environment model; row env + snr represents the model composed
by environment model and sensor model; row env + snr +mdw adds middleware model into
previous one; and the last row is the complete model with all components. It turns out to
be that the complete model including bedroom and shower room scenario is too large for
verification. We split it into two sub-models according to the locations. The experiment
results show the rapid increase of state space when more components are composed.
5.2.2 Guaranteed Reminders (P2)
A well designed reminding service is very important for assisting elders with mild dementia.
We list two reminder services in the bedroom and shower room scenarios respectively as
follows. Rest of the four reminders can be specified in similar ways.
Guaranteed Lying Wrong Bed Reminder (P2.1) This property states that when a
patient is sleeping in a wrong bed, the system will always prompt the LyingWrongBed
reminder eventually.
3Sts- States
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#define LyingWrongBed (sensors[RfidBed_1] 6= EMPTY
&& sensors[RfidBed_1] 6= 1);
#define RemindedWrongBed (ReminderStage[LyingWrongbed*2 + 1] 6= 0);
#assert SmartBedroom() ✏ 2 (LyingWrongBed ! 3 RemindedWrongBed);
Here, condition LyingWrongBed specifies the scenario that someone else is sleeping on
patient1’s bed, and RemindedWrongBed defines the state the reminder is prompted.
Guaranteed Sitting Bed Too Long Reminder (P2.2)
This property states that when a patient who has troubled sleep by sitting on the bed for
too long, the system will always prompt a reminder ask him to sleep eventually.
#define TroubleSleep (sensors[PRESSUREBED_1] == SITTING
&& Duration[PRESSUREBED_1] > 30);
#define RemindedSleep (ReminderStage[SIT_BED_TOO_LONG*2 ]6= 0);
#assert SmartBedroom() ✏ 2 (TroubleSleep ! 3 RemindedSleep);
Here, condition TroubleSleep specifies the scenario that someoneis sitting on bed more than
30 time unitess, and RemindedSleep defines the state the reminder is prompted.
Guaranteed Wandering In Showerroom Reminder (P2.3)
This property states that some patient is inside the shower room but no activities are
detected that the wander flag is set to be true. In this case, the reminder asking the patient
to leave shower room will eventually be sent so as to prevent slipping/ falling of the patient.
#define WanderingInShowerRoom (Pos_Person[1] == SHOWERROOM && WanderFlag);
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#define WanderReminded (ReminderStage[WANDERING_IN_SHOWERROOM*2] 6= 0);
#assert SmartShowerRoom() ✏
2 (WanderingInShowerRoom ! 3 WanderReminded);
where condition WanderingInShowerRoom specifies the scenario where a patient is recog-
nised to be wandering in shower room, andWanderReminded defines the state the reminder
is prompted.
Guaranteed No Soap Used Reminder (P2.4)
This property states that when the system detects that no soap usage for more than 15
time units while the patient is showering, the reminder contains instructs to use soap will
eventually be sent.
#define ShowerWithoutSoap (ShowerFlag && Duration[SHAKESOAP] >= 15 &&
!SoapFlag && Pos_Person[1] == SHOWERROOM);
#define NoSoapReminder (ReminderStage[SHOWER_NO_SOAP * 2] 6= 0);
#assert SmartShowerRoom() ✏ 2 (ShowerWithoutSoap ! 3 NoSoapReminder);
where condition ShowerWithoutSoap specifies the situation that the patient is showering
which has lasted for 15 time units but there is no soap event sensed, and NoSoapReminder
defines the state the reminder is prompted.
Guaranteed Shower Too Long Reminder (P2.5)
This property states that when the system detects that a patient is showering and the
shower tap is running for more than 30 time units, the reminder Shower Too Long asking
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patient to finish shower will eventually be sent so as to prevent patient for catching cold or
faint.
#define ShowerTooLong (ShowerFlag && Duration[SHAKETAP] >= 30
&& Pos_Person[1] == SHOWERROOM);
#define EndShowerReminded (ReminderStage[SHOWER_TOO_LONG * 2] 6= 0);
#assert SmartShowerRoom() ✏ 2 (ShowerTooLong ! 3 EndShowerReminded);
where condition ShowerTooLong specifies the the condition which decides the patient is
showering for too long, and EndShowerReminded defines the state the reminder is prompted.
Guaranteed Tap Not O↵ Reminder (P2.6)
This property states that when the system detects that the shower tap is not o↵ for a long
time, the reminder Tap Not O↵ will eventually be sent.
#define TapNotOff (sensors[ShakeTap] == UNSTATIONARY
&& Duration[ShakeTap] > 30);
#define OffTapReminded ( ReminderStage[TapNotOff*2] 6= 0
|| ReminderStage[TapNotOff *2+1] 6= 0);
#assert SmartShowerRoom() ✏ 2 (TapNotOff ! 3 OffTapReminded);
where condition TapNotO↵ specifies the situation that the shower tap is turned on for more
than 30 time units, and O↵TapReminded defines the state the reminder is prompted.
The results of the verification are shown in Table 5.3. The first two reminders are checked
against the bedroom system model while the rest are against shower room model. Surpris-
ingly, all the reminders on shower room fails and it takes variant time to invalid a property
due to the depth of the bugs.
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Property Result #States /k Time /s
P2.1 LyingWrongBed (LWB) True 808.4 616.8
P2.2 SitBedTooLong (SBTL) True 798.3 607.2
P2.3 WanderingInSR (WIS) False 58.24 27.48
P2.4 ShowerNoSoap (SNS) False 196.6 107.5
P2.5 ShowerTooLong (STL) False 1018 2635
P2.6 TapNotO↵ (SNO) False 701.8 489.1
Table 5.3: Experiment: Guaranteed Reminders Checking
5.2.3 Contradict Knowledge
The following property is specified to check whether there are contradictions in the system.
For example, if the PIR sensor is in SILENT status, there should be no one in the shower
room.
#define Contradiction ( Pos_Person[1] == SHOWERROOM
&& sensors[PIR] == SILENT);
#assert SmartShowerRoom() reaches Contradiction;
5.2.4 Conflicting/False Reminders
False Reminders
False reminders are generated prompts that should not be sent to patients. In the following,
we specify a situation that the Sit Bed Too Long reminder is sent to patient1 but in fact
he is not in the bedroom.
#define FalseReminder (Pos_Person[1] 6= BEDROOM
&& ReminderStage[SitBedLong] 6= 0 );
#assert SmartBedRoom() reaches FalseReminder;
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Conflicting Reminders
In the following, ConflictReminder defines a state where two reminders (i.e. WanderingInSR
reminder and Shower No Soap reminder) are simultaneously prompted to one patient.
#define ConflictReminder ( ReminderStage[ShowerNoSoap * 2] 6= 0
&& ReminderStage[WanderingInSR * 2] 6= 0);
#assert SmartShowerRoom reaches ConflictReminder;
We tested the system model if it can reach certain false states listed above. They results are
shown in Table 5.4. The False result in first row says it is invalid that the Lying Wrong Bed
reminder will send to a wrong person. To invalidate a property requires exploring the whole
state space. Thus, the time taken in verifying the property FalseReminders : LWB is much
more than verifying the rest of the properties4. Furthermore, there are many occasions of
the reminders in the system to conflict with each other as shown in row 3 and row 5-10 in the
table. This is due to the inability of deciding the correct location of the users. Furthermore,
it is obvious that scheduling policy of reminders in AMUPADH needs to be improved.
5.3 Discovery of Unexpected Bugs
Counterexamples are returned as evidences if the system model violates certain properties.
They are of great value to system engineers to debug the system. The set of confirmed bugs
are reported as follows which are unexpected by the development team.
System implementation fails to meet requirements
4While verifying reachability properties, the model checker will stop visiting system states as soon as a
witness trace is found.
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Model Fault Type Result #States /k Time /s
Bedroom
FalseReminders: LWB False 731.5 371.7
FalseAlarm: SBTL True 1.463 0.479
CR: LWB vs. SBTL True 20.6 7.89
Shower Room
InConsistency True 0.404 0.180
CR: SNS vs. WIS True 10.34 4.150
CR: SNS vs. STL True 20.98 7.898
CR: SNS vs. WNO True 10.54 3.660
CR: STL vs. SNO True 16.35 5.785
CR: STL vs. WIS True 16.35 5.767
CR: WIS vs. WNO True 5.2 1.758
Table 5.4: Experiment: Testing Faults
• Guaranteed Reminders This experiment reveals a critical problem of the system that
the system fails to monitor the patient’s location correctly. A patient exiting the
shower room with tap left on is a typical case. The two reminders, Shower Not O↵
andWanderingInSR will repeatedly prompt even though there is no one in the shower
room.
Unexpected Faults Arising out of system complexity
• False Alarm in Bedroom The result of the second property is witnessed to be valid.
Through careful investigation, we notice that the rule defined for Sit Bed Too Long
does not have an identity attached to the rule’s condition and hence this reminder is
sent to the bed’s default owner regardless of the bed’s current user.
• Conflict Reminders From the experiment results, we found many scenarios where
there are reminder conflicts. For example, a patient wandering in the shower room
tirggers the WanderingInSR reminder. He then ignores the reminder and turns on
the shower tap to play with water (A typical behaviour of a dementia patient). The
water runs for a long time that the Shower No Soap reminder is triggered, therefore
causing the system to prompt the conflicting reminders.
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Positive feedbacks are given by system designers and engineers. In general, they improved
their system by amending the rules with necessary identify information. Furthermore, in
order to precisely detect the patient’s location, they added extra PIR sensors in the bedroom
and some rules to assure the consistence among context variables.
5.4 Discussion
Usefulness We gained several observations from this case study. First, model checking
techniques can provide a very good guide on system design. From our experiences of working
with designers of the system, they usually focus on setting up a demonstration based on
selected scenarios without considering other useful situations. It is not only because of the
high cost of hardware devices but also to complete a full demonstration is time consuming.
In fact, the development and consideration of all possibilities when constructing scenarios
and rules is an impossible task and would either take many man-hours to find out through
actual deployment. In fact, some of the bugs (e.g., False Alarm) we reported are occurring
in execution of AMUPADH system and some of them are unexpected (e.g., inconsistency).
The counterexamples reported from the experiment also helped the engineers to pinpoint
the source of the bug. Besides, it is important to find unexpected bugs based on the
stakeholders requirements before deployment of the whole system. Hence the engineers can
retrieve certain normal or abnormal scenarios they are interested in based on our analysis
results.
Additionally, we observed the failure of updating the correct location information of the
patient leads to the violation of important properties. From the discussion with hardware
engineers, we learned that RFID readers have limited detection range. We may think it is
unwise to solely rely on RFID readers to track the patients. During the experiments, we
also noticed that a lot of redundant messages are sent out by the reasoning engine which
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increase the complexity of the system and slow down the verification.
Thoughts of solving state space explosion in PvC system verification The exper-
imental results reflect the typical state space explosion problem. The number of states in
checking deadlock freeness of the complete model reaches the level of 108, which is the limit
of explicit-state model checkers like SPIN and PAT. The state of art state space reduction
methods like partial order reduction may not have significant improvement of this prob-
lem. Compositional verification on the other hand draws our attention. From the deadlock
freeness checking, we noticted that if all components are locally deadlock-free, it is of great
possibility that the complete system model which is a composition of all the components is
free of deadlock. Obviously verifying a local property of a component is much easier than
verify it against the system model. Furthermore, the general architecture of PvC systems
suggests that there are almost no sharing recourses between components. The indepen-
dency between system components further proves that compositional verification could be
a feasible solution to state space explosion problem. Thus, in future, we shall explore how
composition verification techniques can be applied.
In this work, we propose a formal modelling framework for PvC systems. Di↵erent mod-
elling patterns are discussed according to the typical features of systems such as concurrent
communications, context-awareness and layered architectures. We also provide environment
modelling patterns which are usually not considered in modelling complex systems. Fur-
thermore, critical properties of safety and liveness requirements are identified and specified
in proper logics such as specifying guaranteed reminder services using LTL. To demonstrate
our approach, we present a case study of applying the modelling framework to a health-
care system for dementia patients. Critical properties are verified using PAT model checker
with unexpected bugs revealed. Experimental results and sources of the bugs are explained.
This work demonstrates the usefulness of formal methods (particularly model checking tech-
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niques) in analysing PvC systems. Possible future works of this research could be applying




Rule Anomalies Detection: A
Model Checking Approach
The challenges facing PvC systems especially for Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) applica-
tions are in providing activity recognition of assisted people and also rendering adequate
assistive services. It become more challenging when there are multiple users sharing the
environment. A detailed interview survey is conducted in [30] showing that in a multi-user
environment, activities could be performed in sequential, interleave, concurrent and even
conflicting steps. Novel activity recognition approaches are proposed based on multi-model
sensor readings such as rule based logic reasoning [82, 29, 74, 7]. For example, if the pres-
ence of user, Alice in the shower room is detected by RFID sensor and Passive Infrared
sensor while the other sensors remain silent, the system is then aware of Alice’s wandering
in shower room that she needs help. Their approaches are more accurate and more practical
than those relies on images and videos (not accepted in practical for privacy issues).
However, the correctness the rule base remain a non-trivial problem. Incorrect or vague
rules could impair the system’s capability in determining activities, which could then result
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in a lack of, or inappropriate service to be o↵ered. Unreliable rules would also provide a
misleading reflection of the actual situation, which is unacceptable in mission-critical or
urgent scenarios. The task in correcting relatively large rule repositories is considerably
laborious. Therefore there is a need to construct a system that is able to verify and ensure
the specificity of rules, and to also automatically correct the erroneous rules. From our
experience of deploying a rule based activity recognition system, known as AMUPADH [11]
in PeaceHaven nursing home, we identified four challenges:
• Such a rule based AAL system incorporates a reasoning engine that performs activity
recognition based on rules that are pre-determined by domain experts, which in this
case pertains to nurses and caregivers stationed at PeaceHaven. These rules assist
the system in monitoring residents’ activities and provide the appropriate reminder
prompt to residents through reasoning.
• We observe that although monitored residents perform Activities of Daily Living that
is consistent with prior information provided by nurses, there are still occasions where
information provided by nurses is insu cient to construct a system that can recognise
all the resident’s activities. Hence, it is possible that the system could still provide
erroneous prompts.
• We determine that these issues are a result of the rules’ inability to infer and recog-
nise all activities based only on first order descriptive logic. Rules are also created
with logic loopholes due to unawareness of actual scenarios. We are also unable to
fully capture factors involved in the changing ambient environment within our rules.
Therefore such logic flaws could only be exposed during actual deployments and due to
limited granularity and coverage of our sensors, in addition to uncertainties within the
ambient environment, the manually defined rules did not perform up to expectations.
• The resulting system thus becomes very di cult to debug because of the relatively
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large number of rules and various scenarios that have to be tested in actual deploy-
ments to ensure the system is working.
In this work, we propose ACARP, an automatic approach which is based on exhaustive
manipulation of all possible scenarios to tackle this rule verification problem. The common
rule anomalies are defined by comparing the relations between rules such as redundant rules
are rules that have similar conditions. Instead of syntax checking, we discovered that these
anomalies can be represented as reachability and liveness properties that can be verified
against a system model. Thus, the rules verification problem is transformed into a model
checking problem. By adopting the formal modelling framework proposed in Chapter 4,
we constructed the scenario model for activity recognition. Further, ACARP automates
the rule modelling by translating rules into CSP# modelling language [75] which is an
expressive and well supported modelling language. In such as way, the rule anomalies can
be automatically detected by reusing the existing model checking algorithms e ciently. Our
approach is applicable for general rule based PvC system since the common architecture
are adopted.
6.1 ACARP Rule Checking System
Rules and their respective rule engines are considered to be an important part of human
behaviour and activity monitoring systems. Rules can be complicated and crucial for real-
time and mission critical applications, especially for healthcare purposes. However, it is
di cult to manually discover and correct errors within relatively large number of rules. As
evidenced in the modelling and verification of the AMUPADH system, rules can be checked
using model checking techniques, and counter examples reported by model checkers can be
used to identify possible errors in the rules. In the following subsections, we explain how
ACARP can parse Drools rules into CSP# and auto-detect rule anomalies.
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6.1.1 Drools Rule Engine
The Drools [18] reasoning engine contains rules that can be written using first order de-
scriptive logic. Rules are able to handle scenarios with multiple conditions(IFs) and conse-
quences(THENs). Context-aware reasoning engine [92] is proposed and implemented within
the AMUPADH system. However, complicated scenarios with overlapping activities cause
logic flaws and some rules are unnecessarily activated. When certain rules are changed,
other rules dependent on these modified rules can become redundant. Additional rules that
are inserted to complement present rules can also further complicate the system.
We tried overcoming these problems by appropriately classifying the rulesets into di↵erent
groups of rules. Any modifications made to a group of rules would a↵ect only rules within
the particular group. However, this is not a perfect solution as there would still be situations
where rule conflicts would occur between di↵erent rule groups which are used to monitor
the entire smart home. Therefore the model checker PAT would be used to help resolve this
problem by performing rule checking and verification.
6.1.2 System Workflow
As shown in Figure 6.1, the system is designed to incorporate a parser that takes Drools
rules and Java classes as input, so that the system can automatically produce a model in
PAT. PAT subsequently checks the newly-created rule model against the properties defined
in Section C.6. If some properties are satisfied, a counterexample will be reported. PAT then
analyses and traces the report to locate the erroneous rules and autocorrect them according
to predefined logic, or the system can also alert users to perform manual correction.
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Figure 6.1: Auto Correction System Component Diagram
6.1.3 Translating Drools rules to CSP#
We use Drools because it is a popular rules platform widely adopted in research fields and
industries. Drools Expert1 is an open source rule engine maintained by JBOSS community.
It is broadly applied in recommendation, financial security and other business systems.
The language syntax of specifying Drools rules is based on first order descriptive logic and
external methods and classes written in Java can easily be used in Drools. PAT supports
both of these features such that first order logic can be directly mapped to its form in
CSP#, and Java classes can be parsed into C# external library, which can be called in
CSP# models. Therefore, we parse Drools rule syntax into CSP# in PAT.
For usage of temporal rules with our approach, users are required to use the Real-Time Sys-
tem (RTS) module within PAT. Our approach assumes sensor inputs are true and without
uncertainty. The full syntax of Drools is quite expressive and the general pattern is shown
1Drools Expert: http://www.jboss.org/drools/drools-expert.html
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in the example below. Interested readers are encouraged to read [18] and [92] for details.
rule "Person lies on BedA, Wrong Bed"
when s1: Sensor(id == "RFID", name != "PersonA")
Sensor(id == "BedA", state == "LYING")
msg: MessageInterface()
then msg.send("Error: " + s1.getName() + " is lying on wrong bed.");
end
The above rule example obtained from the AMUPADH system clearly defines the conditions
and consequences describing the situation of a person lying on the wrong bed. The bed has
a RFID reader and pressure sensors installed. When a person other than “PersonA” uses
the bed and registers a pressure status of LYING , an alert message is sent . Note that the
symbol “s1” gives a name to an object or field that can be later quoted in the scope of this
rule and “Sensor” can be viewed as a field or a point for external method call or object
reference.
Parsing DROOLS rule to CSP#
After identifying the general pattern of Drools rules, the mapping of rules are defined in
this section.The rule engine consists of the main rule file and the Java classes that specify
global variables and external methods. We manage the parsing process as listed below:
Step 1: Extract Shared Information For the purpose of easy management, the shared
information is declared and kept in Java classes instead of rule files. This information
includes the global variables and constants.
Step 2: Mapping Rules into CSP# The parser processes the rules one at a time and
splits the rule into three parts, namely the rule name, conditions and consequences by
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reading the keywords rule, when and then respectively. We then map the Drools rule
into CSP# by mapping rule names into rule associated comments, the conditions to
ifa expressions, and the consequences into ifa statements, so as to point to the next
rule.
The two-step parsing tool automates the process of modelling rules and reduces the time
required for verifying rulesets. Human intervention might be required in rewriting certain
Java classes into C#. However, experience shows that this e↵ort is minimal, since Java
classes are seldom changed during system development.
Users who understand the context and usage of the rules are most suited for conducting
this process as the generated model’s performance is dependent on the user’s expertise
in accurately translating rules and inclusion of additional embedded semantics from Java
classes into the PAT model. However, our approach does not directly support the modelling
of rule priorities, but there are extensible work in progress. The choice of using a di↵erent
rule engine is also possible, but it would need to adhere to PAT’s input requirements.
6.1.4 Detection of Rules Anomalies
We model anomalies as properties within PAT. Based on results and feedback obtained from
the AMUPADH system deployed at PeaceHaven nursing home, we identify the following
critical properties:
  Property 1: Non-reachable rules
Non-reachable rules are trivial as some rules’ conditions are never satisfied during
ruleset execution. These rules can be unintentionally introduced by rule developers.
Although the system’s correctness is una↵ected, they add complexity to the model and
slow down the rules evaluation process. Detection of these rules is done by checking if
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every rule is reachable during the exhaustive search of system state space. Correction
by automatically removing such unnecessary rules is o↵ered by the ACARP system.
  Property 2: Redundant rules
Redundant rules are occurrences of multiple firing rules at the same system states
which producing identical or di↵erent system result. We define two kinds of redundant
rules, duplicated rules and subsume rules. The former refer to rules whose condition
parts are the same, whereas the latter applies to rules where the conditions of one rule
is a subset of the other. The detection of these rules can be done by checking if the
two rules in question are always fire together. We perform correction on these rules,
by removing one of the rules if both sets of conditions and consequences are identical.
If the consequences are di↵erent and not conflicting, we merge them into a single rule
and classify the remaining rules as conflicting rules.
  Property 3: Logically Conflicting Rules
Logically conflicting rules are rules that satisfy all conditions at a particular state,
but the consequences are not logically sound and thus are conflicting. This property
cannot be easily detected in routine system tests and the possibility in finding this
property using additional model checking techniques is still dependent on the design-
ers’ experience in finding such rules. We detect this error by checking if possible pairs
of conflicting rules can happen at the same time and analyse the rule traces, so as to
point out the conflicting pair of rules for manual correction.
6.2 Experiments and Discussion
We tested our implementation on two rulesets, which are rules used for two respective areas,
namely the bedroom and shower room. As shown in Table 6.1, the two rulesets contain rules





Bedroom 17 2 8/3 2
Shower Room 22 5 16/2 -
Avg. Time /s - 2.05 3.05 -
Table 6.1: Experiment: Anomaly Detection in Activity Recognition Rules
that are paired and tested for anomalies of non-reachability, redundancy and logic conflicts.
The advantage of using a model checker like PAT is that it provides feedback consisting
of counterexamples or traces of actions if any anomaly is detected, which is very useful
for analysis of our system. The traces can point out names of erroneous rules and their
respective violated properties. The activity sequence that leads to the property violation
will also be listed out.
From the experiments, we found cases of the following anomalies. In the bedroom scenario,
our system detected a rule that was non-reachable even after an exhaustive simulation of all
possible situations. We realised that it was a rule defined to recognise an activity of opening
a cupboard. However, in that particular state of the system at the time of detection, there
was no sensor deployed to detect such an activity. We subsequently confirmed that rule de-
velopers forgot to remove this rule from the repository even after the use case of recognising
cupboard usage has been previously abandoned. During the test for redundancy, ACARP
discovered five duplicated rules which were accidentally added into the rule repository for
testing and were not removed due to negligence.
Multiple pairs of logically conflicting rules were discovered within the rulesets used for our
PeaceHaven deployment of the AMUPADH system. We also observed multiple reminders
that were simultaneously prompted to the same user and we tried replicating such con-
flicting scenarios using the model checker PAT. The verification result with regards to the
reachability of this defined scenario turns out to be valid within our model, thus providing
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us with a trace that denotes the monitored user have been showering for a long period of
time, yet continues to ignore the reminder that prompts him to use the shower foam. This
was the reason that led to the triggering of two contradictory reminders that request a
user to perform activities in two di↵erent locations at the same time, which is physically
impossible. We were able to trace this situation using our ACARP system.
Discussion From the experiments, we discovered the stated anomalies as described by
our defined properties. They could be caused by changes made to the scenarios or rules.
It is impractical to manually examine and verify the validity of relatively large rulesets.
Moreover, some existing rule verification techniques can only perform simple syntax checking
which fail to detect logical conflicts. The other techniques and methodologies also could
not be used in our system due to the high level language features used within modern
rule engines, in addition to the lack of general tools and support. Hence, our approach is
required in order to provide features for modelling and also to e↵ectively detect the defined
anomalies and be able to perform customised verification for other testing purposes.
6.3 Related Work
In rules verification, anomalies are identified and classified into di↵erent categories. Vari-
ous algorithms are proposed to detect anomalies in order to build robust systems. Ligeza
and Nalepa [43] reported state-of-the-art rule representation and types of inferences. Tax-
onomies of rule anomalies are proposed regarding redundancy, consistency, completeness
and determinism. However, their rules are simple compared to context-aware rules that
are used in our system. In addition, there was no discussion regarding the detection and
resolution of anomalies too.
Drools verifier [1] from JBOSS community also performs rules verification. This tool
searches for anomalies such as redundancy and subsumption but their approach is based
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on merely syntax analysing and it lacks the ability in discovering high level semantic errors
such as conflicting rules.
Preece et al. [62] surveyed the verification of rule based systems focusing on detecting
anomalies. They described four types of anomalies regarding redundancy, ambivalence,
circularity and deficiency. Five rule verification tools are compared based on their capability
of detecting the four anomalies. They provide insights on underlying principles of rule
verification and state of the art in building a tool for carrying the task. However, their
definitions for anomalies and the surveyed algorithms are not directly applicable to our
system. Firstly, their methods are based on the syntax and semantic logics between rules
instead of the rule e↵ects on the system behavior. Secondly, the algorithms are mostly
designed for goal driven rules, such that the conditions and consequents of a rule have
strong causal connections and consequences are true only when all conditions of a rule are
satisfied. This might not necessarily be true in our ACARP system.
Researchers in [19] used Ambient Calculus to model a location sensitive smart guiding
system in a hospital. The mobility issue is well modelled and reasoned in their work using
modelling methods, but without adopting a rule-based approach. Our work is able to adopt
hierarchical modelling languages which is also supported by model checkers like PAT for
automatic verification.
Therefore, new methods for analysing rules in our ACARP system are needed in consider-
ation of our context-aware rules.
In this work, we presented a system that is able to use model checking techniques and the
model checker PAT in performing rule verification of activity recognition rules within a
smart home environment. We used Drools engine and tested our rules within a deployment
scenario at a local nursing home. In order to ensure validity of the rules, we created a
model of the rules and checked for non-reachability, redundancy and logically conflicting
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properties of the rules. These three important properties allow us to evaluate the rules and
also assist in automatic rule correction, therefore reducing reliance on human intervention
and the time needed for verifying the entire ruleset.
Chapter 7
A MDP-based Approach for
Reliability Analysis
One well-known application of PvC system is to assist elderly/ disabled people to live in-
dependently at their homes such as AMUPADH system. In the system, various hardware
devices and software components are cooperating together to produce a correct reminder
service. For examples, multiple sensors and an inference engine is used to perceive envi-
ronment changes and user intentions. Small home network is setup for communications
between distributed components. Actuators such as bluetooth speaker, IP TV or iPad are
used for prompting interactive reminder services. In general, a PvC system is considered to
be reliable when all required services are successfully delivered at the right time to the right
person. However, there are many causes leading to system failure, e.g. a critical sensor fails
or a network node malfunctions causing important messages being lost. Due to limitation
of current technology, such failures are unavoidable, thus it becomes critical to analyse and
manage the reliability in an acceptable rate.
Analysing the reliability of a PvC system is not trivial. As it is well-known, PvC systems
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are inherently complex. They are composed of multi-layers of software and hardware com-
ponents which have limited capability and accuracy. Researchers in [59], [65] reported that
the often inherent inaccurate and unreliable low-level sensors are used to detect context
information from the environment. This is probably due to cost e ciency considerations,
i.e., less sensors or low-capability but cheaper sensors are selected due to budget constraints.
Moreover, PvC systems are often rule based where rules are manually constructed by engi-
neers with limited expert knowledge. Sometimes, two di↵erent scenarios are characterised
as similar cases because the rules defined to recognise the scenario is similar. For example, a
rule defined to recognise the abnormal behaviour, showering-for-too-long, may have similar
condition with the rule defined for tap-not-o↵ . Both of the rules depend on the same sensor
detecting shower tap on for more than certain time. It often leads to wrong and confusing
results. Wireless communication is unstable in the system as well. For instances, Zigbee
which is a low-cost, low power, wireless mesh network is adopted for communication among
sensor and network nodes such as bridge or router go down from time to time. Human er-
rors like a user forgets to wear the sensible tags could also causing the failure of the system.
Besides the complexity of the system, the feature of non-deterministic behaviour hinders
the application of most existing approaches. In PvC systems, information detected from
multiple sensors are combined in order to recognise a user activity. For example, to detect
the showering without using soap behaviour, the shake sensors on tap and soap dispenser
are needed. However, due to the unpredictable user activities, it is impossible to decide
a particular sequence of sensor activation. For instance, after entering the bedroom, the
user might sit on the bed, triggering the bed pressure sensor or he might go to washroom
directly triggering the RFID sensor for identity tracking. Thus, the order of sensor trigger-
ing is non-deterministic. All in all, an approach which is able to handle both the complex
architecture and nondeterministic behaviour is needed.
Probabilistic model checking gain great importance, especially for such complex system with
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non-deterministic behaviours. Reliability analysis is an useful application of this technique.
Some properties are of interest to end-users and developers of PvC system like “what is
the overall system reliability?”, “to reach a certain overall reliability, how reliable should
certain sensors be?” and so on. Reliability analysis by modelling system architecture
with Markov Chains is first proposed by Cheung [14] in 1980. It has been applied in
various case studies, e.g., Gokhale et al. [26] analysed the SHARPE tool for stochastic
modelling by constructing a DTMC and found out the relation between system reliability
and fault density per component (subsystem). Goseva et al. [27] performed a case study
on a system of the European Space Agency including reliability analysis and sensitivity
analysis. Wang et al. [85] analysed stock market system by construct DTMC and predicted
the system reliability. However, all these case studies are software systems. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no reliability analysis has been conducted on any PvC systems
which involves not only software systems but also networks, sensors and human activities.
In such a complex system, probability distribution of transitions among system components
are not able to obtained in most of the cases. MDPs allowing use of nondeterministic choices
to model hard-to-predict transitions are adopted for modelling of PvC systems.
In this work, three general but highly important questions related to the reliability of PvC
systems are investigated. First, “what is the overall system reliability if reliability of all
its components and subsystems are known, considering all possible user behaviours, and
unreliable factors?”. This is referred to the problem of reliability prediction. This question
is to be answered necessarily before system deployment since end users would prefer to
know how reliable the system is. Second, “what is the reliability required on subsystem or
some devices if there is an expected reliability on overall system?”. This is referred to the
problem of reliability distribution. Addressing this issue is pretty useful because we can have
specific quantitative requirement on designing software subsystems or selecting hardwares,
whose quality are highly related to cost in most of the time. Last but not the least, we are
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interested in finding out the most critical parts to system reliability, based on quantitative
measurement, that relatively more e↵orts and fund can be spent on? This can be done
based on sensitivity analysis.
7.1 System Modelling using MDPs
Compared to DTMC, MDP allows us to capture both probabilistic and nondeterministic
behaviors. A central issue is: when to use nondeterministic choices and when to use proba-
bilistic choices. In general, probabilistic choices can be viewed as informed nondeterministic
choices. That is, we use a nondeterministic choice when we have no definitive information
on how the choice is resolved. For instance, if all we know is that there are two di↵erent
outgoing transitions after executing a component C , we model the two transitions using a
nondeterministic choice. If the choice is made locally and we are aware of each outgoing
transition, we can model C with a probabilistic choice. However, if the result of executing
C is correlated to its inputs, there are two cases. If the inputs are the result of execut-
ing some other component K in the system, we may either model it as a nondeterministic
choice conservatively; or we calculate the probability distribution of C ’s results based on
the probability distribution of K ’s results. If, however, the inputs of C are from an exter-
nal environment which is di cult to predict (e.g., like the tra c of stock transactions), a
nondeterministic choice would give us a “safer” model.
There are three major elements in an MDP model for PvC systems, i.e., the nodes, the
transitions and the reliability values. In the following, we take the model in Figure 7.1 as
an example to explain the modelling technique.
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Nodes
Typically, in a general PvC systems, the sources of unreliability could be failure of sensors
and network devices, error in softwares and connection loss/transmission failure in networks.
Thus, in an MDP model of a PvC System, nodes are abstractions of sensors, software
components and network devices. To decide which device/ component are necessary to be
modelled, we need to analyse the rules which is used for reasoning. For example, in TNO
case, four sensors are related for recognising this behaviour. Besides, there are multiple
choices of playing this reminder e.g., playing on iPad, on Wi-Fi network or on Smart Phone
through 3G network. Thus, the four sensors, iPad, smart phone, Wi-Fi network and 3G
network need to be included in the model as nodes. Similarly, the Zigbee network, mini
server and rule engine are related.
In Figure 7.1, there are three types of nodes, i.e., circle nodes denote for sensors, square
nodes for hardware devices including software component residing inside, and cloud shape
nodes for networks. Double circled nodes are accepting nodes where all of them are success
nodes which are abstractions of displaying devices of reminders expect for the failure node.
The di↵erent shapes of nodes are for demonstration purpose, in an MDP model, they are
treated the same.
Transitions
In PvC systems, there are usually two types of relations between nodes happening before and
message forwarding relations. By analysing the reasoning rules, we are able to extracting
the relations between sensors. Happen before relation usually exists among sensors. It is
decidable when there is a particular order of triggering sensors. For example, in Figure 3.2,
the RFID reader is placed near the door. It is triggered earlier than other sensors in the
room if the system starts with all users outside. Thus, in the MDP model, it should be
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Figure 7.1: Bathroom Scenario- TNO: Tap Not O↵
placed in front of the rest of sensor nodes.
However, sometimes, the happen before relation is not deterministic. For instance, in the
model of Figure 7.1, there is no specific orders between shake sensors on the tap and soap
dispenser. Thus, we need to enumerate all the possible orderings. Besides, there is one
rule decides the behaviour on shake sensor on Tap solely among the two shake sensors.
Thus, there is a transition link from ShakeT to Zigbee making the ordering asymmetric.
We suggest that it is better to enumerate all the possible transition orders in the initial
model, especially when there are multiple rules defined based on similar sensors.
As for message forwarding relations, they are decided in the system design. For example, in
the TNO model, the messages are sent to the mini server via Zigbee network. Thus, Zigbee
node is placed between the sensors and mini server with transitions indicating the sequence
of messages transmission. Similar rules apply for rest of the transitions.
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Reliability Labelling
One final step is to label the nodes and transitions with reliability values. It is usually
provided by system engineers. Nodes are labelled with reliability values of the correspond-
ing devices. For transitions, there are di↵erent cases. At the initial node, the outgoing
transitions usually representing the user behaviours. In the TNO case, there is 20% of time,
the user will throw the sensible tags away (result drew from an experiment conducted by
the engineers). Thus, initially, there are 0.2 probability leading to system failure directly
as the user identity is unknown. Additionally, the happen before relations are usually non-
deterministic choices with no specific probabilities, thus by default, we assign the value 1.
As for forwarding relations, due the the signal strength, transitions to/ from network nodes
have di↵erent reliabilities. For example, in Figure 7.1, transitions from Wi-Fi node to bridge
node has the reliability of 0.8 since the bridge is placed on the wall outside the bedroom.
The nurse PC in common area is further away from the bedroom, thus the transition from
bridge to PC is as low as 0.75.
Fortunately, AMUPADH system has been deployed in a real user environment for data
collecting, the engineers are able to provide realistic estimations of device reliabilities based
on event log analysis. Since the reliability data varian on di↵erent days, we choose the best
e↵ort ones.
7.2 Reliability Analysis Problems
Based on the MDP model constructed in above section, three interesting directions of
reliability analysis is demonstrated. Figure 7.2 shows the workflow of this approach. The
approaches for reliability prediction, distribution and sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure
7.2 (a), (b), (c) respectively. In the following, each of the approaches is demonstrated.


























              Legend
           Input/output of steps














A Component i 
For Sensitivity 
Analysis, And All 
Components 
Reliability
Figure 7.2: Workflow: (a) reliability prediction; (b) reliability distribution; (c) sensitivity
analysis
7.2.1 Reliability Prediction
As shown in Figure 7.2 (a), the reliability value of each component and an MDP model
of a system are required for calculating the overall system reliability. This is equivalent
to check the probability of the system never fails. Di↵erent methods have been developed
to calculate the maximum and minimum reachability probabilities, i.e., the probability of
reaching to the accepting states, denoted by Pr(M , a). Value iteration as introduced in
Chapter 2.2.3, is adopted for its better performance than most linear programs. Predicting
the reliability of the overall system based reliabilities of components is essentially calculating
the probability of reaching a successful state from the initial state.
There could be multiple paths in a MDPs model where each path is considered as a scheduler.
The reason for this is that there are multiple success state in addition to nondeterministic
choices of outgoing transitions. As a result, the measurement of interest is thus the maxi-
mum and minimum reachability probabilities. Let bi be a state in the set of success state B .
The lower bound of the overall system reliability is the minimum value of Pmin(M |= ⇧bi)
for each bi in B . Similarly, the upper bound is the maximum value of Pmax (M |= ⇧bi) for
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each bi in B .
7.2.2 Reliability Distribution
The approach on distributing the overall system reliability requires two inputs: (1) a relia-
bility requirement R on the overall system; (2) a parameterised system model in the form
of an MDP with weights for the components participating in reliability distribution. The
workflow is shown in Figure 7.2 (b). The goal is to find a reliability requirement on each
component whose reliability is unknown so that the overall reliability requirement is satis-
fied. The resultant requirement on component c is in the form of a reliability probability
Rc .
Given an MDP M and a scheduler  , we can obtain a DTMC M . Assume the assigned
weight for component (in reliability distribution) i is wi , which is also given. Therefore,
each component reliability requirement can be expressed as wix , where x is a variable.
Therefore, the system reliability (i.e., Pr(M , a)) is a polynomial function constituted by
variable x only. Using numerical methods like Newton’s method, we can obtain a lower
bound on x , which is the reliability requirement we need. For multiple schedulers and we
need to guarantee that the system reliability requirement is satisfied with any scheduler.
We compute a lower bound on x for every scheduler and the maximum of the lower bounds
gives us the minimum requirement on component reliability. Based on [9], only finitely many
memoryless schedulers need to be considered. Our algorithm works as follows. First, an
unvisited memoryless scheduler   is selected. Next, using  , we perform the value iteration
method on M . The following shows how the result vector V is updated. Assume scheduler
  chooses a distribution µs at state s: V
(n+1)(s) =
P
t2S x ⇥ µs(t)⇥ V (n)(t). Once a
stopping condition is satisfied, we obtain a constraint V (init)   R and solve the equation
V (init) R = 0 using Newton’s method to obtain a lower bound on x so that V (init)   R
is true. The steps above are repeated for all memoryless schedulers.
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The number of total memoryless schedulers equals to the product of the numbers of distri-
butions for each state, e.g., if there are ten states and two of them both have 3 distributions
and the rest has one, the number of schedulers is 9. Essentially, the more nondeterminism
there is, the more schedulers are to be considered. In practice the number of schedulers are
manageable as we are dealing with a high-level system model. Further, since each scheduler
is considered to be independent, we can parallels the computation.
7.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis indicates how to improve the overall system reliability e ciently and
e↵ectively under a circumstance of limited resource. For example, if a system is shown to
be not reliable enough, based on each components reliability and the system architecture,
how to prioritize the components such that reliability improvement of a higher priority
component would result in more system reliability improvement.
The workflow for sensitivity analysis is shown in Figure 7.2 (c). In general, the sensitivity
si of the system reliability R with respect to the reliability Ri of i th component is defined as
the partial derivation of system reliability, denoted by f with respect to Ri , as in the form
 i =
 f (R1,R2,...Ri ,...Rn )
 Ri
. However, analytical solution is hard when system is large and non-
deterministic. In our work, we only consider sensitivity analysis on one component each
time given all other components’ reliability. The sensitivity analysis problem is reduced
to calculate  i =
 V (init)
 Ri
. V (init) is obtained as the same way as the one in reliability
distribution but there is only one variable in this case.
7.3 Analysing Reliability on AMUPADH system
In the beginning of AMUPADH project, we spent three months paying visits to the nursing
home for collecting requirements. By observing the patients daily life and multiple inter-
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Figure 7.3: Bedroom Scenario- UWB: Using Wrong Bed
views of nurses/doctors, two critical issues with dementia patients (caused by constantly
short memory loss and initiation problem) are raised that are sleeping behaviour in bed-
room and showering behaviour in bathroom. Furthermore, as introduced in Chapter 3.3, six
typical abnormal scenarios that requires reminder help or caregiver intervention is revisited
in the following:
  UWB: Using Wrong Bed Since a room in the RLA is shared by 2-3 people, the elder
patient, especially new residence, tends to lie on a bed without recognising whether
its his/her own bed.
  SBTL: Sitting on Bed for Too Long Some of the agitated patients often have
sleeping problems. They are easily bothered and irritated by what is happening in
the environment. A typical symptom is that the patient will get up at midnight and
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sit on the bed for very long time until assisted by nurses/caregivers.
  SNS: Shower No Soap Due to memory loss, dementia patients constantly forget the
normal steps of performing daily activity. In the taking shower activity, the patient
could forget what to do next right after the shower tap is turned on. It is reported by
the nurses that some of the patient finish the shower very fast without applying soap.
Concerned about the personal hygiene, patients presenting this behaviour need to be
helped.
  STL: Showering for Too Long Similar to the SNS issue, some patients will standing
under the shower head for a long time. It is a critical issue that exposing in the water
for a long time could cause the patient black out. If not helped immediately, it will
even causing death to the patient.
  TNO: Tap Not O↵ It is often the case that dementia patients forget to turn o↵ the
tap after showering. In order to save water and energy, this scenario is also detected
and reminded in the system.
  WiW: Wandering in Washroom Caused by initiation problem, it is possible for
the patient to forget at any step of the taking shower activity. Thus, a wandering
behaviour is also typical and patients need to be assisted in such cases.
In fact, taking shower turns out to be the most concerned issue of nursing elderly dementia
patients. In PeaceHeaven, the nurses need to monitor the showering activity of every patient.
Considering the ratio of nurses to patients is 1:15, this shower monitoring creates heavy
burden to nurses. After a careful analysis, both the SNS and STL scenarios could be
monitored by the system. A two-level reminding solution is thus provided in AMUPADH
that when the system recognises an abnormal behaviour, it will prompt a reminder to the
patient. If the behaviour remains, an alert will be sent to the nurse’s mobile phone to raise
her attention.
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Rel. UWB SBTL SNS STL TNO WiW
Schedulers 32 24 32 16 64 16
Max 0.3744 0.4190 0.3670 0.3707 0.3707 0.3707
Min 0.2956 0.2463 0.2897 0.2927 0.2897 0.2927
Time <1 ms
Table 7.1: Experiment: Reliability Prediction
7.3.1 System Modelling using MDP
In practice, it turns out to be unrealistic to model all the scenarios in one MDP model
considering the complexity and readability. Since scenarios are independent with each
other, we construct the MDP model separately for each scenario. Based on the modelling
approach introduced in Section 7.1, we present the MDP model of UWB scenario in Figure
7.3 as an example. In this case, the system heavily relies on the RFID reader to detect the
identity of the user who is using the bed. As shown in Figure 3.2, the RFID reader is placed
at one side of the bed. Since it is undecidable that which sides the user will choose to get on
bed, it is necessary to enumerate all possible orderings of RFID reader node and pressure
sensor node. As there is always a 20% chance of failure associated with RFID reader due to
the user throwing away the sensible tag, thus the model is asymmetric for di↵erent ordering
of the nodes.
7.3.2 Reliability Analysis Experiments
We conducte the experiments on six scenario models on a normal PC with 8 GB memory.
All the experiments are finished within seconds.
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Reliability Prediction
As shown in Table 7.1, the reliability of six scenarios ranges from 25% to 40% with di↵er-
ent scheduling1 which is quite low considering using the system at home with no human
supervision.
One general observation from this experiment is that the system highly relies on the RFID
sensors for identity tracking. However, the RFID sensors have the lowest reliability among
all the sensors. In fact, due to budget issues, the RFID reader used in the system has a half
meter detecting radius which makes it cheaper than others with a larger radius. Besides,
these sensors usually involve human errors such as disposing the sensible tag. Especially
for elderly dementia people since they are not very stable, the system cannot expect to rely
on them to provide critical information. Thus, our experiment result suggests the engineer
to replace this sensor for one with a larger detecting range or one does not require a tag.
Reliability Distribution
Further, we explore the reliability distribution on some nodes upon a overall reliability
requirement. Two groups of nodes are tested which are sensor nodes and network related
nodes. By fixing reliability of the network related nodes, we calculated the distribution on
sensor nodes and vice versa. We consider a uniform distribution (where all the nodes have
the equal weight) among sensors since they have a relatively similar reliability.
As shown in Table 7.2, it requires each network related node to have a reliability of 0.913
in order for all the scenarios to achieve a reliability of 0.4. However, it is impossible when
the requirement raises to 0.5. By a careful examination, we discover that the rule defined
1A scheduling in the model denotes for one possible path from the starting node to one success node.
Since there are non-deterministic choices in the model, there are multiple possible scheduling.
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Req. Nodes UWB SBTL SNS STL TNO WiW
0.4
Network 0.854 0.904 0.913 0.911 0.911 0.911
Sensor 0.886 0.938 0.941 0.923 0.923 0.923
0.5
Network 0.914 - 0.965 0.963 0.963 0.963
Sensor 0.996 - 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.994
Time /s 3.45 2.68 3.86 1.87 11.00 2.35
Table 7.2: Experiment: Reliability Distribution
for SBTL has an error. Because the engineer failed to put the user’s identity information
into the rule’s condition, this reminder will have a half chance be sent to the wrong user.
At this point, it is intuitive to ask the question that which node or group of nodes a↵ects
the system reliability heavier than the others? If improvements are made on such node(s),
it will be more e cient. Thus, we seek the answer from sensitivity analysis.
Sensitivity Analysis
There are multiple schedulers in each MDP model as shown in Table 7.2. We choose a
typical one for demonstration and omit the rest due to page limit. As shown in Figure
7.3, the model connected in thick black links are the target schedule. It includes the most
features of other schedulers e.g., rely on multiple sensors and the RFID reader with lowest
reliability. The iPad case is chosen since playing reminders on iPad is the most common
way in practice.
Two nodes and a bundle of nodes are chosen for the experiment which are RFID reader
node, Zigbee network node, and bundle of nodes related to Wi-Fi network (their reliabilities
are dependent). Figure 7.4a shows the reliability distribution on these nodes. As we can
see, improvement on RFID reader node and Wi-Fi bundle can achieve a higher reliability
than Zigbee node. Figure 7.4b further suggests that when the reliability of these nodes
are greater then 0.7, increasing reliability of nodes in Wi-Fi bundle can achieve better
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Figure 7.4: Experiment: UWB- Sensitivity Analysis on Nodes
improvement than other nodes. In practice, increasing the reliability of a network might
be cheaper than purchasing a sensor with higher reliability, e.g., placing more bridges along
the path.
To summarise, these experiments are able to give a good estimation on the overall system
reliability. Additionally, it provides useful guidance on improving the system e ciently,
especially in budget concerned systems. However, our approach requires knowledge on
modelling system in MDP models which make it di cult to use for engineers without
necessary background.
7.4 Related Work
Since Cheung’s work in [14], several models and approaches on software architecture based
reliability evaluation have been studied and compared. Comprehensive surveys on the
existing approaches can be found in [36, 28, 25]. Compared to the above work, our approach
handles systems with model parameters which are hard to obtain.
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Reliability Allocation vs. Reliability Distribution Reliability distribution prob-
lem investigated in this work is similar but slightly di↵erent from the reliability allocation
problem studied in [55, 60, 35]. Given a Markov Chain model of the system architecture,
reliability allocation focuses on testing resource allocation to achieve optimal performance.
A well known reliability allocation deals with the setting of reliability goals for individual
subsystems such that a specified reliability goal is met [40]. While ensuring that a system
is su ciently reliable, the allocation is to find an appropriate set of reliability measures
apportioned to each component, based on some optimisation goals, such as minimising the
amount of testing time [60, 48]. [48] discusses the reliability allocation which is to min-
imise the number of remaining faults given a fixed amount of testing e↵orts. Di↵erent from
algorithms on allocating testing resource [60, 35, 48], our method on reliability distribu-
tion focuses on minimising component reliability requirement, while fulfilling system level
reliability requirement.
Reliability Analysis of Conventional Software Systems vs. Pervasive Computing
Systems [66] extended the scenario specification (based on Message Sequence Charts) to
produce the reliability model the component-based software systems and used Cheung’s
model for reliability calculation. However, PvC systems are very di↵erent from the software
systems studied in their work. In fact, non-deterministic behaviours commonly exists in
the system that Cheung’s approach had no direct supporting modelling formalism. Fur-
thermore, due to those non-deterministic choices, it is not often the case, probability of all
outgoing transitions from a source state sum to one as required in Cheung’s model.
This chapter demonstrates our reliability analysis work of PvC systems using MDP based
modelling and verification approach. The models are manually constructed from the design
and implementation of the systems. Three groups of experiments are conducted to answer
the questions of “What is the overall system reliability with known reliability value of each
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nodes?”, “To reach a certain overall system reliability, how reliable should the sensors/net-
works be?” and “Which node (could be a sensor or network device) a↵ects the overall
reliability the heaviest?”. Experiments show surprising results that the overall system reli-
ability is below 50%. It is also suggested that to improve the reliability of Wi-Fi network
will be more e cient to improve the system reliability. In future, approaches for acquiring




In this thesis, we have investigated ways of applying model checking techniques to analyse
complex PvC systems. In particular, we have contributed in the formal modelling of the
system and verification of its correctness, reliability and real-time requirements.
First of all, a formal modelling framework is proposed by studying the common architec-
ture of PvC systems. General modelling patterns are proposed using formal modelling
structures. The framework includes the modelling for both the environment including the
human behaviours and system design such as concurrent communications, context reasoning
behaviours etc.. Furthermore, by investigation of stakeholders (Doctors, Nurses, System En-
gineers etc.), critical system requirements are identified. They are transformed from natural
languages to formal properties such as safety and liveness properties which are checkable
using existing model checking algorithms. This approach is applied to AMUPADH system
which adopts CSP# modelling language and PAT model checker for verification. Several
unexpected bugs are revealed and we are able to locate the sources of these bugs with the
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help of counterexamples provided by the model checker.
Secondly, we demonstrate the work of automatic detection of rule anomalies. A tool is
developed to translate the popular industrialised rule language Drools Rules to the modelling
language of CSP# by providing the mapping relations of language constructs. Additionally,
we specified the common rule anomalies such as conflict rules in formal properties such
that the rules verification problem is transformed to a model checking one. These activity
recognition rules in AMUPADH system are verified using this approach. Our case study
found rule anomalies including non-reachable, redundant and conflict rules in the rule set
with counterexamples revealing the execution paths leading to the errors.
Qualitative system analysis helps people to identify design flaws and improve system logic,
but it does not give much intuition of how to improve the system consisting of many hard-
ware components for the sake of both correctness and reliability. For example, if some
inconsistency is found in the system, is it a better solution to replace a current sensor with
a similar sensor of higher accuracy than improve the network reliability for less message
loss. Naturally, quantitative analysis, especially probabilistic model checking techniques
are chosen to tackle such problems.
Thus, in the third part of our work, we explore MDP-based reliability analysis techniques
for improving the system design. MDP based formalism is chosen for modelling PvC sys-
tems because it has better support for modelling the non-deterministic system behaviours
than other probabilistic modelling languages. In this work, a system model is manually
constructed in MDP from the system design with reliability values and network topology
provided by system engineers. Three groups of questions are explored which are “What
is the overall system reliability with known reliability value of each nodes?”, “To reach a
certain overall system reliability, how reliable should the sensors/networks be?” and “Which
node (could be a sensor or network device) a↵ects the overall reliability the heaviest?”. The
AMUPADH system are modelled and verified using the model checker RaPid. Experiments
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show surprising results that the overall system reliability is below 50%. It is also suggested
that to improve the reliability of Wi-Fi network will be more e cient than replacing a sensor
to improve the system reliability.
Overall, model checking techniques are found to be useful in analysing PvC systems. System
flaws can be exposed in correctness analysis, erroneous rules are detected automatically and
MDP-based reliability analysis can provide insights of improving system design. Analysing
correctness of the system with timed requirements are also important and non-trivial. It
faces the grand challenge of state space explosion. Yet, still there is lots of work to be done.
8.2 Future Challenges
Due to the various challenging issues in PvC systems, and the lack of comprehensive and
complete solutions to them, we thus propose model checking techniques to be applied and
specially tailored for these systems. In the following, we shall list the possible future research
works. They are arranged in an order that looks like a research plan that gradually leads
to the ultimate goal of formal and automated analysis of PvC systems.
8.2.1 Integrated Formal Modelling
As we explored in Chapter 4, there are di↵erent modelling languages for modelling di↵erent
system features, for example, CSP# is perfect for modelling concurrent interactions and
data processing in the system, Mobile Ambient are good at modelling location constraints,
TCOZ is most suitable for specifying timing constraints of sensors and MDP is best for
probabilistic behaviours. To model a large and hybrid system like PvC systems, any single
one of these languages is not enough.
One possible solution is to design a powerful modelling language which integrates all these
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useful language features. However, this solution produces a highly complex language that
will create an enormous challenge for defining its semantics. Compass Modelling Language
(CML) [88] is such a language proposed by Jim Woodcock and his team. It is a semantically
heterogeneous language, with state-rich imperative constructs based on VDM, communica-
tion and concurrency based on CSP, object orientation with object references, and discrete
time based on Timed CSP. In [87], they propose to use Unifying Theories of Programming
(UTP) to describe semantic domains for CML.
An alternative solution is to integrate the heterogeneous models rather than the languages
features. The idea is to create models of system components using the most suitable lan-
guages (e.g. CSP# for environment model, TCOZ for sensor models etc.) and glue/connect
these models together using proper language constructs such as interfaces. This solution
refers to the research problem of integrating heterogeneous models or describing architecture
connection. Emerged in late 1990’s, researchers has proposed Connectors [4] and Interface
Automata [20] etc. as glues of component models. This approach does not have much
limitation on the modelling languages of the system components. It is more focused on
modelling/specifying the high-level interaction among system components.
Both of the two solutions seem feasible for modelling a PvC system considering its layered
architecture and heterogeneous components. The former solution proposes a semantically
open modelling language that new language features can be included if there is a need while
the latter one is also flexible that it requires minimal e↵ort in language design. However,
for both of the approaches, defining the semantics of the resulting language remains a big
challenge. We will explore along these directions in future.
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8.2.2 Scalable Verification
In Chapter 5, the case study on AMUPADH evidenced the major bottleneck of applying
model checking in complex systems- State Space Explosion. For a state space larger than
108 states, most explicit-state model checking tools will fail. However, real life applications
usually have a much larger state space. It is a strong demand for us to explore more scalable
approaches. We will discuss the possible future direction in the following.
State Space Reduction Technique The two most popular reduction techniques are
partial order reduction and symmetry reduction. These techniques reduces state space re-
spectively by pruning out excessive permutable execution orders of actions and by grouping
symmetric states into equivalence classes and representing the equivalence classes with a
representative state. In fact, there are such relations existing in PvC system models. For
example, for a system shared by two patients who have the similar behaviours, the two
actions of patient A enters the bedroom and patient B enters the bedroom are independent
that either order of the two actions will have the same post state that both of the patients
are in the bedroom. Thus partial order relation exists in such a case. As for symmetry
relation, for two particular system states, a general reminder that not related to patient’s
identity is triggered in both states while one state with patient B is showering and patient
A is sitting on bed and the other with patient A showering and patient B sitting on bed,
these two states can be considered as symmetric and can be grouped.
Although these two techniques are e↵ective, they are di cult to be applied for the reason
that the partial order or symmetric relations are highly model dependent and needs to be
discovered and defined prior to the implementation of the algorithms. Furthermore, these
methods are only useful when there are lots of such relations in the system’s state space.
To find all the possible relations are highly non-trivial and require lots of work.
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Compositional Verification Compositional verification on the other hand draws our
attention. The idea was proposed dated back to the 1980s. Representative of such works
are Assumed Guarantee by A. Pnueli in [61] and Interface Processes by E. M. Clarke et al.
in [16]. They have contributed in decomposing global safety and liveness properties into
local verifiable ones and deducing global property satisfaction from these local verification
results.
Noticing the deadlock freeness verification experiments of Chapter 5, we believe that under
some assumption, if all components are locally deadlock-free, the complete system model
which is a composition of all the components is free of deadlock. Obviously verifying a
local property of a component is much easier. Furthermore, the general architecture of this
type of systems suggests that there are no sharing recourses between components. The
independence between system components further promotes that compositional verification
could be a feasible solution in solving state space explosion problem in PvC system domain.
In future, we shall research on this direction.
Although the research problem of compositional verification has established for 30 years,
it remains a hot and tough topic. There are a few challenges for us. First of all, many
of existing works explore process level composition under the same model while we are
looking at model level composition under a model of heterogeneous models. Decomposing of
properties must be carefully dealt with taking the coupling between component models into
consideration. Furthermore, it is desirable to design automatic approaches for compositional
verification in the context of large and complex PvC systems. It is a grand challenge if we
are aiming to automatically verify a model of heterogeneous models.
Beside of the above problems, we also want to design a graphic modelling and simulation user
interface. This is because, most designers and engineers from pervasive computing domains
have limited background knowledge of formal methods. Visualisation of the modelling
process and result simulation would be more useful and more fun.
Chapter 9
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Appendix A
Operational Semantics of CSP#





e! (V 0,P 0), e 2 X
[ hide1 ]
(V ,P \X ) ⌧! (V 0,P 0)
(V ,P)
x! (V 0,P 0), x 62 X
[ hide2 ]
(V ,P \X ) x! (V 0,P 0 \X )
(V ,P)
e⌧! (V 0,P 0)
[ seq1 ]
(V ,P ; Q)
e⌧! (V 0,P 0; Q)
(V ,P)
X! (V 0,P 0)
[ seq2 ]
(V ,P ; Q)
⌧! (V 0,Q)
(V ,P)
x! (V 0,P 0)
[ ch1 ]
(V ,P⇤Q) x! (V 0,P 0)
(V ,Q)
x! (V 0,Q 0)
[ ch2 ]
(V ,P⇤Q) x! (V 0,Q 0)
(V ,P)
⌧! (V 0,P 0)
[ ch3 ]
(V ,P⇤Q) x! (V 0,P 0⇤Q)
(V ,Q)
⌧! (V 0,Q 0)
[ ch4 ]
(V ,P⇤Q) ⌧! (V 0,P⇤Q 0)
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[ non1 ]
(V ,P u Q) ⌧! (V ,P)
[ non2 ]
(V ,P u Q) ⌧! (V ,Q)
(V ,P)
x! (V 0,P 0)
[ int1 ]
(V ,Pk | Q) x! (V 0,P 0k | Q)
(V ,Q)
x! (V 0,Q 0)
[ int2 ]
(V ,Pk | Q) x! (V 0,Pk | Q 0)
(V ,P)
X! (V 0,P 0), (V ,Q) X! (V 0,Q 0)
[ int3 ]
(V ,Pk | Q) X! (V 0,P 0k | Q 0)
(V ,P)
⇤! (V 0,P 0)
[ inter1 ]
(V ,P 4 Q) ⇤! (V 0,P 0 4 Q)
(V ,Q)
e! (V 0,Q 0)
[ inter2 ]
(V ,P 4 Q) e! (V 0,Q 0)
(V ,Q)
⌧! (V 0,Q 0)
[ inter3 ]
(V ,P 4 Q) ⌧! (V 0,P 4 Q 0)
Appendix B
A Complete List of Rules
Rule Rule Condition Action
0: Person entered
Bedroom




rfidShowerRoom.state 6= EMPTY setPersonLocation(rfidBedroom,
SHOWERROOM)
2: Person sitting/-
lying on Bed A






lying on Bed B





4: personA sat on
Bed A for too long
(30mins)




5: personB sat on
Bed B for too long
(30mins)
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6: Person lying on
wrong bed (BedA)
rfidBedA.state != personA &&





7: Person lying on
wrong bed (BedB)
rfidBedB.state != personB &&





8 1: PersonA is
showering
shakeTap.state == UNSTATIONARY
&& shakeTap.duration < 40 && pir-





8 2: PersonB is
showering
shakeTap.state == UNSTATIONARY
&& shakeTap.duration < 40 && pir-









&& shakeTap.duration   120 && pir-








&& shakeTap.duration   120 && pir-




10 1: PersonA is
washing for too
long and tap not
o↵ (15 mins)
shakeTap.state == UNSTATIONARY
&& shakeTap.duration   30 && pir-
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10 2: PersonB is
washing for too
long and tap not
o↵ (15 mins)
shakeTap.state == UNSTATIONARY
&& shakeTap.duration   30 && pir-










&& shakeTap.duration   30 && shake-
Soap.state == STATIONARY &&
shakeSopa.duration   30 && !soapFlag









&& shakeTap.duration   30 && shake-
Soap.state == STATIONARY &&
shakeSopa.duration   30 && !soapFlag









shakeTap.state == STATIONARY &&
pirShowerRoom.state == FIRING &&
pirShowerRoom.duration   40 &&









shakeTap.state == STATIONARY &&
pirShowerRoom.state == FIRING &&
pirShowerRoom.duration   40 &&
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13 1: PersonA for-
got to switch o↵ the
tap or shower (15
mins)
shakeTap.state == UNSTATIONAY
&& shakeTap.duration   40 &&
soapFlag && !noSoapEvent && pir-




13 2: PersonB for-
got to switch o↵ the
tap or shower (15
mins)
shakeTap.state == UNSTATIONAY
&& shakeTap.duration   40 &&
soapFlag && !noSoapEvent && pir-




14: Reset all sensor
when non-activity
in Washroom
shakeTap.state == STATIONARY &&
shakeSoap.state == STATIONARY
&& pirShowerRoom == SILENT &&
(washFlag == true || showerFlag ==













soapFlag == true && noSoapEvent







soapFlag == true && noSoapEvent





Case Study on A Transmission
Protocol: CSMA/CD
Transmission protocols are one kind application of real-time systems, which are policies
govern interactions among communication agents. They play an important part in computer
networks and distributed systems. Many protocols have been successfully used, but they
may su↵er from some unexpected failures. The most common faulty in protocols is the
occurrence of deadlock; others include loss of message, message destruction, and timeout.
In the attempt of verifying real-time systems, we did a case study on a simple but typical
transmission protocol CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense Multiple Access / Collision Detection) [79],
which is widely used in Ethernet networks.
In the literature, Sergio Yovine in [91] used the tool KRONOS [12] to formally verify the
CSMA/CD protocol. Timed automata is used to model the protocol which captures the
system’s time constraints in a explicit way. He used TCTL to verify important system
properties such as reachability, bounded response etc., as well as using timed-abstracting
equivalence means to compare a real time implementation of a system with an abstract and
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untimed specification of it, verifying the correctness of system behaviours. A similar case
study is done using UPPAAL model checker [6, 3] which is also based on timed automata.
However, it is a tedious and error-prone task to explicitly set/reset clock variables in in
timed automata, especially when the model size grows very large. Besides, the UPPAAL
model of CSMA/CD is abel to reach a state where there is a deadlock which is infeasible
in checking bounded most liveness properties.
In our case study, we use the modelling language STCSP to model this protocol for its
richness of timed constructs and implicit clocks which are implemented to set/rest clock
variables automatically while execution of the model. Implicit clocks have certain benefits
that it can model the compositional timed systems, to satisfy high-level system requirements
like deadline, timeout, timed interrupt, which can be composed sequentially, or in parallel.
We also use timed refinement relationship to check system correctness like KRONOS using
timed-abstracting technique. However, our refinement checking is to check whether an
implementation satisfies a specification or not. It is di↵erent from KRONOS, which uses an
extended version of branching time temporal logic named Computation Tree Logic(CTL)
with time TCTL to do timed property checking. We also show our verification results of
certain critical properties in our home-grown model checker PAT.
C.1 CSMA/CD: A Collision Detection Protocal for Local
Area Network
In Ethernet network, several agents may be connected by a single bus. A problem arises that
how to assign the usage of bus to only one of many agents who competes for. Carrier Sense,
Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) protocol describes one solution to
this problem.
The simplified algorithm of CSMA/CD is shown in Fig. C.1. Roughly speaking, whenever
C.2. MODEL FOR CSMA/CD PROTOCOL 135
Figure C.1: Algorithm of CSMA/CD Protocol
an agent starts sending messages, it must first listen to the bus and wait for absence signal
before transmitting. When the absence signal comes which means the bus is idle, the agent
begins to transmit. If it detects a busy bus, it waits for a random amount of time before
another try. As for the propagation time for message to travel from source node to the
destination node via bus, an agent may listen to the bus to be idle while another agent is
sending message before the message reaches any destination. Thus, collision occurs, then all
of the agents are informed of this collision, and abort their transmission immediately. All
transmitting messages are lost and all agents should compete for the bus again by waiting
a random time.
C.2 Model for CSMA/CD protocol
As in real world, there are several important time parameters, such as di↵erent propagation
time according to various materials of network wires. In order to better model the real
C.2. MODEL FOR CSMA/CD PROTOCOL 136
world protocol behaviour, we make the following assumptions. First we suppose that agents
communicate in the 10Mbps Ethernet with a worst case propagation (denoted here by  )
for absence signal travel of 26 µsec. Additionally, we fix that messages have a fixed length
of 1024 bytes, and the time for transmitting a complete message is assumed to be a constant
time (denoted here by  ) 808 µsec, including propagation time. Besides, we don’t model
backo↵ strategy for retrying, we just assume that agent will retry within 2  (52 µsec) time
unit elapsed since the last step. Also, we make assumptions that no messages are lost during
transmitting and there’s no bu↵er for incoming messages at the agent side.
Based on the above assumptions, we then model the CSMA/CD protocol in the real-time
system module in our PAT tool. The model for this protocol consists of two components,
namely Sender (sending agent) and Bus (message transmitting channel). Sender and Bus
communicate by synchronous events, so we define this communication by pair-wise syn-
chronisation channels. In order to make all the variables and processes of this model to be
clearly aware, we list all the related contents of this model with a simplified description, as
illustrated in Table C.1.
Modeling Sender Behavior The behavior of component Sender is showed in Fig. C.2.
WaitFor process models the behavior of sender i waiting for upper level messages to come.
Trans process represents sender i completes transmitting messages within   time unit or
detects a collision within 2  (52 µsec) time unit after its sending. Retry process expresses
sender i wait for a 2  (52 µsec) time unit to re-attempt.
Initially, the sender i is in WaitFor process. When a message arrives, one of the following
transitions is executed. If the bus is not busy, the sender starts transmission. Otherwise,
if bus is busy because another sender is already transmitting, it moves to retry state, or a
collision is detected, it waits to retry. If a collision occurs while there is no message to send,
the sender i remains in WaitFor state.
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Category Name Description
Global Definition
N Constant: number of senders
channel newMess 0 Sender gets messages to send
channel begin 0 Sender starts sending message
channel busy 0 Sender senses a busy bus
channel cd 0 Sender detects a collision
channel end 0 Sender completes its transmission
Sender Behavior
WaitFor(i)
Sender i is waiting for a message from the upper
level
Trans(i) Sender i is sending a message
Retry(i)
Sender i is waiting to retry after detecting a col-
lision or a busy bus
Bus Behavior
Idle Bus is free, no sender is transmiting
Active
One sender starts transmitting and is detecting
collision
Active1 One sender is transmitting messages, bus is busy
Collision
Collision occurs and bus broadcasts the collision
information to all senders
Table C.1: Components of CSMA/CD Model
In Trans process, sender i has two transitions, which is modelled as two external choices in
PAT. If a collision is detected before 2  time unit elapsed, the sender goes to Retry process.
Otherwise, it terminates sending the message after exactly   time unit, then it goes to the
initial process.
When sender i is in Retry process, it makes a new step to resend messages before 2  time
unit elapsed since the last step. If the bus is idle, it will begin to transmit and moves to
Trans state; If the bus is busy or receives a collision, it will still be in Retry state.
Modeling Bus Behavior The behavior of component Bus is showed in Fig. C.3. Initially,
bus is in Idle process. When one sender starts sending its message, bus goes to Active
process. If bus receives a signal that sender completes sending, it moves to idle state.
Or after being in Active state for at least   time unit, bus replies busy signal to any new
attempt, which models the fact that the head of the message currently being sent has already
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WaitFor(i) = (cd?i !WaitFor(i))
⇤(newMess!i ! ((begin!i ! Trans(i))
⇤(busy?i ! Retry(i))
⇤(cd?i ! Retry(i))));
Trans(i) = (cd?i ! Retry(i)within[0, 52])
⇤(atomic{end !i ! Skip}within[808, 808];
WaitFor(i));
Retry(i) = (newMess!i ! ((begin!i ! Trans(i)within[0, 52])
⇤(busy?i ! Retry(i)within[0, 52])
⇤(cd?i ! Retry(i)within[0, 52])));
Figure C.2: Model: the Sender
Idle = newMess?i ! begin?i ! Active;
Active = (end?i ! Idle)
⇤(newMess?i !
((begin?i ! Collision) timeout [26]
⇤(busy !i ! Active1)));
Active1 = (end?i ! Idle)
⇤(newMess?i ! busy !i ! Active1);
Collision = atomic{BroadcastCD(0)}within[0, 26]; Idle;
Figure C.3: Model: the Bus
propagated, then bus moves to Active1 state. If another sender starts sending messages
before   time unit elapsed, bus moves to Collision state where it takes no more than  
time unit to broadcast collision to all senders. We use atomic process BroadcastCD shown
in Fig. C.4 to broadcast collision to all senders. After that, bus moves to Idle state. When
bus in Active1 process, which means a sender has begun sending messages without collision,
it will respond busy signal to all request senders until the sender completes transmitting,
then bus moves to Idle state.
Composing CSMA/CD Protocol Model The whole system is executed by all senders
and bus interleave with each other. The communication is implemented by the synchronous
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BroadcastCD(x ) = if (x < N ){
(cd !x ! BroadcastCD(x + 1))
⇤





Figure C.4: Model: the BroadcastCD process
CSMACD = (||| x : {0..N   1}@WaitFor(x )) ||| Idle;
Figure C.5: Model: the CSMACD protocol
channel between senders and bus. We model this as Fig. C.5
C.3 Verification and Experimental Results
Verification Properties In order to formally verify our model for CSMA/CD proto-
col is correct, we define several categories of properties to check whether it satisfies some
properties. These properties in PAT can be categorized as LTL-X Model Checking, Re-
finement Checking and Timed Refinement Checking. In LTL-X Model Checking, properties
are formulated using linear temporal logic formulae without next operator, which includes
safety property and liveness property. Refinement Checking is to verify whether the sys-
tem satisfies the property by showing a refinement relationship between the system and a
model which models the property. The refinement relationship can be trace-refinement, sta-
ble failures refinement and failures/divergence refinement [34]. Timed Refinement Checking
supports refinement checking between timed models, using implicit clocks and zone abstrac-
tion mechanism.
C.3. VERIFICATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 140
Deadlock Freeness (P0)
Informally, safety property states ”bad things” never happen during the execution. Dead-
lock freeness is a safety property that has to be fulfilled so that it is always possible to move
from one state to another. Deadlock freeness property in our model is defined as follows:
#assert CSMACD deadlockfree;
Timed Divergence-free (P1)
If a process performs internal transitions and timed transitions forever without engaging any
useful events, the process is said to be divergent. While the divergent system is undesirable,
for it can give unbound timer, thus disallows timed refinement checking. Timed Divergence-
free property in our model is defined as follows:
#assert CSMACD divergencefree < T >;
Collision detection in a given bounded delay (P2)
Whenever two senders are simultaneously transmitting, a collision is detected in a bounded
delay. In worst case, a sender can start sending at most   time units after another sender,
which means a collision occurs no more than   time unit after two senders simultaneously
transmit. And collision may take   time units to be propagated. So a sender will detect a
collision at most 2  (52 µsec) after it starts transmitting.
Figure. C.6 shows a model that specifies this property. Spec shows that if event begin.0 oc-
curs which means sender 0 begins transmitting, then Constrained1 happens. Constrained1
states if event begin.1 occurs thereafter which means sender 1 starts sending messages almost
simultaneously, event cd .0 or cd .1 must occur within 52 time units, otherwise, no constraints
apply, which is modeled as Relaxed process. In Spec process, if event begin.1 occurs and
then followed by event begin.0, then Constrained2 happens. Constrained2 states if event
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((cd .0! Skip⇤cd .1! Skip)deadline[52])); Spec)
⇤Relaxed ;
Relaxed =
(⇤x : {2..N   1}@(newMess.x ! begin.x ! Spec))
⇤
(⇤x : {0..N   1}@((newMess.x !
(busy .x ! Spec⇤cd .x ! Spec))
⇤(cd .x ! Spec)
⇤(end .x ! Spec)));
Figure C.6: Model: the Collision detection in a given bounded delay
begin.0 occurs thereafter which means sender 0 starts sending messages almost simultane-
ously, event cd .0 or cd .1 must occur within 52 time units, otherwise, it executes Relaxed
process. In Spec process, if no constraints apply, it goes to Relaxed process. Our speci-
fication is to show whenever two senders send messages simultaneously, they will receive
collision within 52 µsec since start transmitting.
In order to verify our model satisfies this property, we use timed refinement to check this
requirement. Here, we define this in the following:
#assert CSMACD refines < T > Spec;
Experimental Results Timed refinement checking allows us to verify Collision detection
in a given bounded delay property which consists of timed transitions. We have experi-
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Property #Senders Result #States #Transitions Time /s
P0
4 Yes 787 1075 0.20
5 Yes 2789 3847 0.60
6 Yes 8851 12227 2.28
7 Yes 26109 35991 8.43
8 Yes 73123 100419 31.03
9 Yes 196997 269319 108.69
10 Yes 514915 700611 361.58
P1
4 Yes 787 1075 0.17
5 Yes 2789 3847 0.66
6 Yes 8851 12227 2.53
7 Yes 26109 35991 9.79
8 Yes 73123 100419 35.69
9 Yes 196997 269319 123.24
10 Yes 514915 700611 407.12
P2
4 Yes 787 1075 0.20
5 Yes 2789 3847 0.90
6 Yes 8851 12227 3.69
7 Yes 26109 35991 14.74
8 Yes 73123 100419 55.38
9 Yes 196997 269319 196.35
10 Yes 514915 700611 655.38
Table C.2: Experiment: Verification of CAMS/CD Protocol
mented CSMA/CD protocol on PAT for di↵erent number of senders. Table C.2 summarizes
the verification results of properties. The experiment testbed is a PC running Windows
XP3 within 2.33GHz Intel(R) core(TM)2 Duo CPU and 3.25GB memory.
From the table C.2, firstly we can see that the number of states, transitions and running
time increase rapidly with the number of senders. Secondly, we can show that PAT is ef-
fective, for it can handle thousands of states in no more than 1000 seconds. The data on
UPPAAL [3] or KRONOS [91] verifying the same models has been omitted from the table
because KRONOS just model two senders, and model in UPPAAL [3] has a deadlock, it
does not consider how to respond busy signal to request sender in multi-agents Ethernet
networks. In fact, bus just broadcasts busy signal to all senders which cause the deadlock.
Since our model does not present deadlock state, the more realistic modelling has brought
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us more states then we can verify our model more correctly.
